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ABSTRACT 
  Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions 
normally ensure that citizens cannot be tried and punished for 
political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere with criminal 
convictions of terrorists and others who pose a nonimmediate but real 
threat to public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use 
various subterfuges to avoid constitutional protections—often with the 
complicity of judges—but when they do so, they risk losing the 
confidence of the public, which may believe that the government 
targets legitimate political opponents. This Article argues that the 
amount of process enjoyed by defendants in criminal trials reflects a 
balancing of two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand, and 
the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other. Political trials 
are those in which the defendant’s opposition to the existing 
government or the constitutional order is the main issue. The Article 
discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust 
process protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the 
risks to political competition are minimized. International trials are 
also discussed within this framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A political trial is a trial whose disposition—that is, usually, a 
finding of guilt or innocence, followed by punishment or acquittal, of 
an individual—depends on an evaluation of the defendant’s political 
attitudes and activities. In the typical political trial, a person is tried 
for engaging in political opposition or violating a law against political 
dissent, or for violating a broad and generally applicable law that is 
not usually enforced, enforced strictly, or enforced with a strict 
punishment, except against political opponents of the state or the 
government. 
Political trials are uncommon in liberal democracies but not 
unknown. In the United States, political trials were conducted in the 
late eighteenth century, when Jeffersonians were convicted of 
violating the Sedition Act. Many people believe that trials for sedition 
02_POSNER.DOC  2/6/2006   4:01 PM 
2005] POLITICAL TRIALS 77 
during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War 
were political trials. And, some have argued that military trials of 
suspected terrorists after September 11 will be political trials. 
These political trials bear a family resemblance to trials of 
deposed leaders of enemy states, including the first Nuremberg trial 
of Nazi war criminals, the Tokyo trial of Japanese war criminals, the 
trials of Slobodan Milosevic and other officials of the successor states 
of Yugoslavia, and the trials of perpetrators of the Rwandan 
genocide. These trials have all been political trials, although 
burnished with legalisms: the defendants were charged with legal 
violations but prosecuted because they were political enemies of the 
states that operate the tribunals. The legal foundation of the trials is 
either explicitly retroactive or based on very general international 
laws or principles that are selectively applied against defeated or 
compliant states. Although recent efforts to establish legal 
foundations for the trials of war criminals and dictators have resulted 
in the creation of the International Criminal Court, American 
opposition to this court ensures that in the near future such trials will 
continue to be political, rather than legal, institutions.1 
Another related group of trials occurs in transitional settings, in 
which a democratic system succeeds an authoritarian system. These 
trials are not international because they take place within a single 
state and involve only the nationals of that state, but they are not 
ordinary domestic trials either because they straddle constitutional 
regimes, raising special problems of retroactivity. Transitional trials 
occurred or were seriously considered in, among other places, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany in the 1990s; Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Chile in the 1980s; Greece and Portugal in the 1970s; 
and France and other occupied countries after World War II. These 
trials were political because the defendants were tried for their 
participation in a despised government, not for any legal violations 
for which they could have been convicted under the old regime.2 
 
 1. See generally FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Philippe Sands ed., 2003). The Nure mberg trials—and especially the first 
trial of major war criminals—are the subject of a large literature. See generally ROBERT E. 
CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983); JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON 
TRIAL (1994); ANN TUSA & JON TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1983). 
 2. Accounts of many of these trials are collected in 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Neil J. 
Kritz ed., 1995). 
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Political trials of all types are heavily criticized, but some are 
more heavily criticized than others. Political trials in authoritarian 
regimes are objectionable, of course, but no more objectionable than 
authoritarianism itself. Political trials in transitional settings are 
understandable, if sometimes regrettable. Because these trials are 
retroactive, they violate the rule of law, and to violate the rule of law 
during a transition to the rule of law seems unfortunate, even 
paradoxical. Still, some observers defend political trials in the 
transitional setting as a way of teaching the public a lesson about the 
evils of the old regime. Political trials in the international setting are 
open to the charge of victor’s justice, but are often seen as expedients 
necessary to provide the foundation for an international criminal 
legal system. This was a common defense of the Nuremberg trial.3 
Political trials in liberal democracies, however, have virtually no 
defenders; they are reviled as a corruption of the judicial process and 
a betrayal of liberal principles. The standard view in the legal 
literature holds that (1) governments have strong incentives to limit 
process and attack their opponents; (2) judges are the guardians of 
due process rights, as well as of political rights such as free speech; (3) 
during times of emergency, governments exploit public fears to crack 
down on dissent; (4) judges should and do stand in the government’s 
way; and (5) when they do not, it is regrettable.4 The defect in this 
theory is the absence of a plausible account of the motivations of the 
actors. Why would judges try to restrain the government, and why 
would a government bent on political domination allow itself to be 
restrained by judges? History shows that judges often enthusiastically 
 
 3. See, e.g., JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 155–70 
(1964). 
 4. See generally, e.g., MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH 
ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977); THE CONSTITUTION 
IN WARTIME (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (2003); H.C. 
PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR 1917–1918 (1986); SHKLAR, supra  note 3; 
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956); PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT “RED MENACE”: 
UNITED STATES PROSECUTIONS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947–52 (1984); GEOFFREY 
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004). Hannah Arendt’s criticisms of the 
Eichmann trial reflect the conventional wisdom about political trials, though she was apparently 
not opposed to a different kind of political trial, that is, one conducted by an international 
tribunal rather than in an Israeli court. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 269 
(1994) (arguing that charges against Eichmann were crimes against humanity that should have 
been heard by an international court). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991), although Amar emphasizes the role of the jury. 
02_POSNER.DOC  2/6/2006   4:01 PM 
2005] POLITICAL TRIALS 79 
facilitate political prosecutions and that governments are perfectly 
capable of ignoring judges who do not.5 
The thesis of this Article is that political trials in liberal 
democracies reflect an unsurprising balancing process at work. In an 
ordinary criminal trial, established procedures reflect a balance 
between liberty and security that is suitable for normal times. Due 
process protections force governments to prove that the defendant is 
dangerous to the public, and not simply a political opponent or 
someone whose conviction would be politically convenient for the 
government. Governments acquiesce in generous due process 
protections in the hope of showing that they can survive legitimate 
political competition: if they do not need to suppress critics, then they 
must have confidence in their policies. 
But during emergencies and times of heightened tension, the 
balance changes. The public demands security, and the government 
can supply it only by detaining and even convicting people without 
strong evidence that they have committed serious crimes.6 These 
people are targeted because of the harm they threaten, not because of 
harm they have done, so ordinary due process standards would 
prevent their conviction. To address these threats, governments press 
courts to tolerate reductions in process, and courts generally (but not 
always) comply. Although at the same time the reduction in process 
creates the danger that the government will target people who are 
effective critics or political opponents rather than threats to public 
safety, this risk to political competition is tolerated by the public 
when the security threat is sufficiently high. 
Thus, what is distinctive about a political trial is that the liberty-
security trade-off that is only implicit in the due process standards of 
 
 5. I will discuss many examples of the first in Part III.C, infra; Lincoln’s refusal to obey 
Justice Taney’s order in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.D. Md. 1861), is the preeminent 
American example of the second. 
 6. Thus, this Article can be placed with recent work discussing how the president’s powers 
should (or should not) change during emergences. Compare Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: 
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? , 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1023–24 
(2003) (arguing that the president should act la wlessly and then seek public ratification), with 
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030–32 (2004) (advocating 
a statutory scheme that would grant the president special powers during an emergency). My 
more modest point is that any time security concerns are heightened (whether or not there is a 
true “emergency”), process protections will be relaxed, and this relaxation can be done in a 
manner that is consistent with basic liberal, democratic principles, as long as one pays attention 
to the difference between suspects who are public threats and suspects who are mainstream 
political opponents.  
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ordinary trials is brought out into the open. The government cries 
“security!” The defendant cries “liberty!” The judge and the public 
make a political judgment about how this trade-off should be 
adjusted, if at all, in light of the real or purported emergency. 
This argument has normative implications, which can again be 
contrasted to those of the standard view. The normative implication 
of the conventional wisdom is that judges should enforce political and 
process rights during emergencies more vigorously than they 
ordinarily do. Political trials are simply never justified, and judges 
should do all they can to prevent them from occurring.7 
The normative implication of my thesis is that political trials are 
unavoidable and must be tolerated, although they can be better 
designed and managed than they often are.8 Due process in a political 
trial balances the credibility of the prosecuting authorities with 
national security. In a nonpolitical trial, process has the main purpose 
of minimizing error and administrative cost. In a political trial, 
process has the additional purpose of maintaining the credibility of 
the government or (what is the same thing) of allowing the conviction 
of people who are public threats while preventing the conviction of 
people who are mere partisan political opponents. Because the 
credibility of the government is an issue, certain steps should be taken 
to enhance the government’s credibility, and in the process to reduce 
the risk that the trial is being used for partisan purposes. These steps 
include involving judges and jurors from opposition parties and 
allowing defendants to mount political defenses. 
 
 7. See, e.g., STONE, supra  note 4, at 542–50. 
 8. My approach is thus to treat liberal principles—like legalism and the rule of law—as 
instrumental rather than ideological; this is in the spirit of Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule 
of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 19 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski 
eds., 2003), and Adam Przeworski, Why Do Political Parties Obey the Results of Elections? , in 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 114. The approach is to ask why the people 
with power—the wealthy, the well born, those with guns—would be willing to commit 
themselves to the rule of law (Holmes), elections (Przeworski), and other liberal democratic 
principles. The answer is assumed to be that it lies in their self-interest, not in the “inherently 
binding power of norms” or “legitimacy.” Holmes, supra, at 24; see also Barry Weingast, The 
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997) 
(presenting a model of politics in which the government exercises self-restraint to avoid 
sanctions from opposition groups). For a related approach by a legal scholar, see Daniel A. 
Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002) (arguing that when states make 
constitutional commitments to protect human rights, and grant the judiciary independence to 
enforce them, they signal that they have a long time horizon, and therefore are unlikely to 
expropriate investments). 
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On this view, there is no normative objection to a political trial 
per se. Such objections arise only to political trials that target partisan 
opponents rather than public threats, and to political trials that target 
public threats but that also erode public confidence in government to 
such an extent as to interfere with normal governance. 
I will not focus on current controversies, including the use of 
military commissions to try suspected al Qaeda and Taliban members 
for war crimes, the use of administrative procedures to identify 
enemy combatants prior to their indefinite detention, the enhanced 
use of deportation procedures against aliens suspected of ties with al 
Qaeda, and the criminal trials of people suspected of terrorist activity, 
such as Zacarias Moussaoui. But these practices may become easier 
to understand in light of historical practices, and I will briefly discuss 
a few of them at the end of this Article. 
Part I provides the historical, legal, and academic background to 
the political trial. Part II explains why rational governments in liberal 
democratic systems will sometimes conduct political trials. Part III 
discusses ways in which these trials can be designed and managed so 
as not to undermine the principle of political competition at the heart 
of liberal democracy. Part IV extends this discussion to related trials, 
including trials of enemy combatants, transitional trials, and 
international criminal trials. 
I.  HISTORICAL, ACADEMIC, AND LEGAL  
BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL TRIALS 
A. Historical Background 
In the classic domestic political trial, the defendant is tried for 
opposing the government or ruling class. The political trial need not 
be based on retroactive lawmaking, though it often is. There may be 
an existing law that prohibits opposition to the government; if so, the 
defendant may be tried under that law and convicted. Such a trial is 
political, even though all process rules may be observed, because the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence depends on the defendant’s political 
beliefs or activities. The reason that political trials are often 
retroactive, either in form or in fact, is that generally applicable laws 
forbidding political opposition are highly unpopular and frequently 
unworkable. A general prohibition of criticism of the government is 
draconian in all but the most authoritarian states. Governments 
depend on criticism and, even when they do not, they are usually too 
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weak to outlaw it. In democracies, legislators shy from laws 
prohibiting political opposition because the legislators know that 
these laws can be used against them if their party loses power. Even 
when the majority favors such laws, opposition parties may have 
enough strength in the legislature or other institutions, such as the 
judiciary, to prevent the majority party from passing laws that have 
force. 
For these reasons, governments that seek to harass or eliminate 
political opponents through the judicial process usually resort to 
generally applicable laws against subversion, conspiracy, disorderly 
conduct, incitement to violate the laws, and so forth. However, they 
enforce them only against people who pose a genuine threat to their 
power or to public security, not against mainstream political rivals or 
ordinary citizens blowing off steam. 
The domestic political trial can be located on a spectrum that 
extends from the summary execution or detention at one end to the 
procedurally correct trial at the other end. At one extreme, the 
government identifies and then captures or kills its opponents without 
informing them of the charges, giving them a chance to defend 
themselves, or involving independent agents such as judges. As one 
moves along the spectrum, one adds procedural protections: general, 
public, prospective substantive rules; the right to a trial; lawyers; 
judges; rules of evidence; rights to cross-examine; jurors; and so forth. 
Military trials and deportation hearings fall at the midpoint of the 
spectrum; the ordinary criminal trial at the other end. As process 
increases, the government loses its power to disable its political 
opponents, but it gains something as well: the ability to claim credibly 
that its prosecutions serve the public interest rather than (solely) the 
government’s interest in its own survival. Part II describes the logic of 
this theory in more detail. 
As noted in the Introduction, not all political trials are domestic. 
Many are international, and others are transitional. Table 1 provides 
some historical examples of each type; the regular domestic trials are 
drawn from American history. Note that the classification of many of 
these cases as “political trials” is controversial, and I include them 
only because they recur in the literature.9 
 
 9. In particular, the Hiss trial does not seem political. Hiss was prosecuted for committing 
perjury, and his trials (the first ended in deadlock) seem to have been fair. See ALLEN 
WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE 412–502 (1978) (describing the trials). The 
same is true for the Sacco and Vanzetti trial and the trial of the Rosenbergs. But many people 
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TABLE 1. POLITICAL TRIALS10 
Panel A. International 
Year Name Result 
1945 Nuremberg Tribunal 19 convictions (12 executions);  
3 acquittals 
1946-
1948 
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal 25 convictions (7 executions) 
1993-
present 
International Criminal Tribunal 
for the FormerYugoslavia 
30 convictions; 2 acquittals 
(through 2003) 
Panel B.  Transitional 
Year Name Result 
1649 Charles I Execution 
1780s American Revolution: trials of 
Loyalists 
Various 
1792 French Revolution: trial of  
Louis XVI 
Execution 
1944 French trials of Nazi collaborators Various 
1974 Greek trials of former government 
officials 
Convictions 
1989 German trials of border guards 
and former leaders 
Convictions and acquittals 
 
regarded these trials as political at the time because the defendants had radical political views, 
and they assumed that the government had trumped up charges to weaken political opposition. 
See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND 
EISENHOWER 61 (1978) (describing the public reaction to Hiss: “obviously guilty not only to 
conservatives but also to Cold War liberals, obviously innocent, the victim of a frame-up, to 
almost all who deplored the purge”). 
 10. For international tribunals, see generally RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR’S JUSTICE: 
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 31 (2001) (Tokyo); TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 504 
(Nuremberg); James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the Law?, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 140, 154 
(2003) (Yugoslavia tribunal). For transitions, see generally 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 2; MICHAEL WALZER, REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION (1974). For American domestic trials, 
see generally AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994); POLITICAL TRIALS 
IN HISTORY: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (Ron Christenson ed., 1991). On Sedition Act 
trials, see generally SMITH, supra note 4. On Civil War trials, see generally J.G. RANDALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951). On World War I–era trials, see 
generally PETERSON & FITE, supra  note 4. On Smith Act trials, see generally STEINBERG, supra 
note 4. On the Haymarket trial, see generally PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 
(1984); JOHN F. BANNAN & ROSEMARY S. BANNAN, LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM: THE 
PEACE MILITANTS AND THE COURTS (1974). Other sources are cited infra . 
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Panel C. Domestic (United States) 
Year Name Charge11 Result 
1798- 
1801 
Matthew Lyon and 
other prominent 
Republicans 
Violation of Sedition 
Act 
Convictions in nearly 
every case 
1805 Impeachment of 
Samuel Chase 
Misconduct Acquittal 
1807 Aaron Burr Treason Acquittal 
1863 Clement 
Vallandigham and 
other Southern 
sympathizers 
Violation of martial 
law 
Conviction by military 
commission; 
detention and exile 
1868 Impeachment of 
Andrew Johnson 
Violation of Tenure of 
Office Act 
Acquittal 
1886 Haymarket riot Conspiracy to commit 
murder, riot 
Conviction of eight 
defendants; 
execution of four; 
three were jailed, 
then pardoned 
1918 Eugene Debs and 
other opponents of 
American 
involvement in 
World War I 
Sedition Convictions; some 
sentences later 
commuted 
1918 Industrial Workers of 
the World (multiple 
trials) 
Conspiracy to obstruct 
World War I 
Mainly convictions 
1919 Jacob Abrams and 
other anarchists 
Sedition Four convictions; exile 
1921 Nicola Sacco and 
Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti 
Murder Conviction, execution 
1923 Marcus Garvey Mail fraud Conviction, 
deportation 
1944 Elizabeth Dilling and 
other Nazi 
sympathizers 
Smith Act violations Mistrial, then 
dismissal 
1949 Eugene Dennis and 
other Communists 
Smith Act violations Convictions 
 
 11. When multiple charges were made, the main charge or a representative charge is listed. 
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Panel C (continued) 
Year Name Charge Result 
1949 Alger Hiss Perjury Conviction 
1950 Hollywood 10 Contempt of Congress Convictions 
1951 Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg 
Espionage Convictions, 
executions 
1968 Catonsville 9 Destruction of 
government 
property 
Convictions 
1968 Boston 5 Conspiracy to obstruct 
draft 
Convictions, reversed 
on appeal 
1969 Chicago 8 Incitement to riot Some convictions, 
reversed on appeal 
1974 Wounded Knee Various offenses 
related to 
occupation of town 
Case dismissed after 
trial 
1989- 
1990 
Oliver North and 
William Poindexter 
Defrauding the 
government 
Convictions; North's 
was overturned on 
appeal; Poindexter 
was pardoned 
1999 Impeachment of Bill 
Clinton 
Perjury and 
obstruction of 
justice 
Acquittal 
 
There have been few international political trials of leaders or 
major officials.12 For an international criminal trial to occur, a state 
must deliver up leaders for prosecution by another state or else suffer 
a decisive military defeat. But no state willingly yields its leaders, and 
throughout most of history victorious states saw no value in 
conducting trials of the leaders of vanquished states. Before the 
modern era, leaders were executed, imprisoned, exiled, or welcomed 
as guest-hostages. Tamerlane displayed Bayezid I in a cage after 
defeating him in the battle of Ankara in 1402. The Thirty Years War 
ended in 1648 with a settlement, and no leaders were tried or 
punished. Napoleon ended his days on the island of St. Helena. The 
War of 1812, the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the 
 
 12. Excluded are ordinary military trials of captured enemy soldiers or noncombatants who 
have committed war crimes. In some ways, these are political trials, but in the main they are not: 
they are based on laws for which there is an international consensus.  
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Russo-Japanese War all ended in political settlements. Germany was 
decisively defeated in World War I, but the desultory efforts to 
prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm collapsed when Holland refused to 
extradite him. Britain abandoned its efforts to prosecute Ottoman 
war criminals because it could not maintain control over Turkish 
territory.13 
The pattern continued after World War II. Most wars ended in a 
political settlement or suspension of hostilities that failed to provide 
for trials; these wars included the conflicts between Pakistan and 
India and between Israel and Arab states, the Korean War, the 
Vietnam War, the war between Britain and Argentina over the 
Falkland Islands, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the first Gulf War. The 
U.S. prosecuted Manuel Noriega for drug crimes after it ousted him 
from the helm of Panama, but this was a far cry from Nuremberg. The 
U.S. has no interest in prosecuting Saddam Hussein, preferring to 
leave him to the Iraqis, albeit with substantial U.S. assistance and 
influence.14 It is ironic that Nuremberg brought respectability to the 
political trial, as it has had virtually no value as a precedent for trying 
leaders of a state that has started wars, or for holding international 
trials of war criminals.15 Only the Yugoslavia conflict, fifty years later, 
resulted in major war crimes trials before an international tribunal.16 
Trials in transitional regimes, by contrast, have been common; 
Panel B lists just a few of the dozens that have occurred. The 
 
 13. GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 106–46 (2001). 
 14. The statute authorizing the trial passed only with the approval of the U.S., and the U.S. 
has sent a team of attorneys to participate in the preparation of the trial. See Neil A. Lewis & 
David Johnston, The Struggle for Iraq: War Crimes; U.S. Team Is Sent to Develop Case in 
Hussein Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at 1. 
 15. Professor Martha Minow argues that Nuremberg inspired the trials of Adolf Eichmann 
in Israel, Argentina’s prosecution of members of its military, Germany’s border guard trials, and 
the trial of Jaruzelski in Poland, but, as she also notes, this claim is in tension with “the 
enormous gap in time between the Nuremberg trials and any comparable effort to prosecute 
war crimes in international settings.” MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 27 (1998). See also 
the valuable discussion of Argentina’s experience in CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL 
ON TRIAL (1996), which notes the relationship between the Nuremberg  trial and the trial of 
Argentine leaders. Whatever the truth about Nuremberg, I have found no support in the 
historical literature for Professor Minow’s claim that the Tokyo tribunal has had similar positive 
influence. MINOW, supra, at 27. Most accounts of it are decidedly negative, e.g., the cha pters in 
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 
1986), especially B.V.A. Röling’s lucid Introduction, in id., at 15. See also the historical accounts 
cited elsewhere. 
 16. There are a few other ambiguous cases, including the Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
tribunals. 
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transitional or successor trial is intended to punish members of the 
old regime—to do substantial justice—and to persuade the public that 
the old regime was evil so that the new regime will be seen as a 
legitimate replacement. 
The most common type of political trial is that which occurs 
within a regime. Panel C is confined to the American experience, but 
it is important to remember that political trials are more common in 
authoritarian regimes than in liberal democracies because opposition 
to the government is usually illegal. Britain, France, and the other 
established democracies also have a long history of political trials. 
American political trials (or trials that are arguably political even if 
not obviously so) have occurred most often during times of upheaval: 
during the founding era, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, 
the height of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the 
Vietnam War. 
Many political trials are clearly identifiable as such because they 
involve laws that target people for their political views or the peaceful 
expression of those views. But because “political trial” is an epithet, it 
has been applied to a broad range of questionable judicial practices 
and controversies that have little in common, and, as a result, the 
term is hard to define. However, the core meaning is relatively clear.17 
On this definition, a political trial occurs when the government uses 
the judicial process against its opponents (including foreign enemies 
and internal dissidents) who have not violated formal, generally 
enforced laws or who have violated only formal laws against political 
dissent. This can happen when a formal law prohibits opposition to 
the government or the constitutional order that the government 
protects, in which case the normal judicia l process rules can be 
respected, or when charges are trumped up, and the defendant is 
convicted of violating laws that have been not been violated or that 
are very general and not enforced against people unless they are 
critics of the government. In the latter case, the conviction must occur 
 
 17. I exclude trials that involve controversial laws or defenses, like the battered-spouse 
defense, which have political resonance, and trials in which the government trie s to enforce a 
generally applicable law (say, against murder) but the jury nullifies the law and acquits a guilty 
defendant for political reasons. In so doing, the jury is licensing the murder of its political 
opponents. See, e.g., DALLIN H. OAKS & MARVIN S. HULL, CARTHAGE CONSPIRACY: THE 
TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED ASSASSINS OF JOSEPH SMITH 184–86 (1975) (describing the acquittal 
of Smith’s murderers by a jury consisting of anti-Mormon citizens). However objectionable, this 
is not a problem of the government trying to maintain its power by eliminating its political 
opponents and is thus outside the scope of this paper. 
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with the complicity of the judge or the jury, or both; normal process 
protections are relaxed.18 Political opponents, as used here, include 
leaders and civilians of hostile foreign states as well as domestic 
partisans.19 
B. Literature 
Most Americans prize their country’s tradition of tolerance for 
political dissent, and the political trial would appear to have no place 
in such a tradition. Political trials are associated with various unjust or 
dubious events: trials of draft resisters and government critics during 
the Vietnam War, of harmless eccentrics or well-meaning dissenters 
during the Cold War, of labor organizers and peace activists during 
World War I. To say that a trial is political is always to condemn it. 
The mainstream literature on these events accepts this popular view.20 
However, there has always been a counterpoint in the literature, 
stimulated by a signal event in the history of the political trial: the 
Nuremberg trial of major war criminals after World War II. Many 
commentators have been unable to allow their reservations about 
“normal” political trials to apply to Nuremberg, when a political trial 
seemed preferable to the alternatives—the release of the Nazi leaders 
on the ground that they violated no international law, or their 
summary execution on the ground that they were evil men and had 
lost the war. Thus, there is a tension: if the political trial at 
Nuremberg was desirable, then one must abandon the popular view 
that all political trials are objectionable. But if not all political trials 
 
 18. For a discussion of the complex relationship between political trials and trials used to 
determine whether a person is an enemy combatant, see infra  Part IV.A. 
 19. My definition falls between the two extremes in the literature. Professor Otto 
Kirchheimer limits political trials to trials that have partisan motivations. OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, 
POLITICAL JUSTICE 49 (1967). Professor Michal Belknap, on the other hand, includes the trial 
that 
is intended to affect the structure, personnel, or policies of government, that is the 
product of or has its outcome determined by political controversy, or that results from 
the efforts of a group within society having control of the machinery of government to 
use the courts to disadvantage its rivals in a power struggle which is not itself 
immediately political or to preserve its own economic or social position. 
Michal R. Belknap, Introduction, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, supra  note 10, at xvi. This 
definition would require classifying almost any trial as political. The definition I use excludes 
trials (fairly) based on laws that derive from the constitutional bargain. Of course, if one thinks 
of the constitutional bargain as itself “political,” then all trials are political, but then one cannot 
make a useful distinction between routine criminal trials and the kind of troublesome trials that 
dominate the literature. 
 20. See, e.g., sources cited supra  note 4. 
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are objectionable, what are the grounds for condemning the trials of 
dissenters in the United States? 
This tension permeates Professor Judith Shklar’s prominent 
discussion of the Nuremberg trial.21 Shklar defends the trial on the 
ground that it promoted the rule of law by applying the forms of 
legality to a novel set of circumstances. It was, in essence, a theatrical 
act of legislation. The trial also served valuable political ends by 
helping to discredit Nazism in Germany and to awaken Germany’s 
dormant legal traditions.22 These arguments are in the service of 
Shklar’s main thesis, a critique of “legalism”—the ideology under 
which the rule of law becomes an end in itself rather than a means to 
the accomplishment of liberal values—and the legalistic view that all 
political trials are objectionable because they violate legal norms.23 
However, Professor Shklar flatly denies that domestic political 
trials can have a valuable role in a liberal constitutional order.24 
Consider her analysis of Judge Hand’s opinion for the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Dennis.25 Rejecting the 
defendants’ First Amendment challenge to their convictions under 
the Smith Act, which prohibited advocacy of destruction of the 
American government by force, Judge Hand argued that Justice 
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test of the First Amendment 
was too narrow; Congress ought to have the power to address future 
 
 21. See SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 170–79. 
 22. By contrast, she views the Tokyo trial as a “dud,” because, in her view, Japanese 
traditions and culture were not receptive to Western style legalism, id. at 181, and the Japanese 
simply did not behave as badly as the Germans—no crimes against humanity, only war crimes 
and crimes of aggre ssion—and thus could portray themselves as moral equivalents of the 
victors. The first point is simplistic: Japanese ethical traditions differ in complex ways from 
Western ethical traditions, but if her claim is that the Japanese were less likely to condemn the 
behavior of fellow citizens than the behavior of foreigners, this feature of their moral system 
would hardly distinguish them from the Germans or the Americans. 
 23. Id. at 156; see also Bernard D. Meltzer, “War Crimes”: The Nuremberg Trial and the 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia , 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 895, 907 (1996) (describing how the 
Nuremberg trial provided closure after World War II by satisfying people’s desire for judgment, 
limiting vigilante justice, and reintegrating Germany into the rest of Europe). Professor Shklar’s 
arguments would be echoed in Professor Michael Walzer’s defense of the trials of Charles I and 
Louis XVI, which, by symbolizing the end of monarchy, performed a valuable political function, 
the ushering in of democracy. See WALZER, supra  note 10, at 5–6. For a contrasting view, see 
MINEAR, supra  note 10, who attacks the Tokyo war crimes tribunal for violating the norms of 
legality. His view appears to be that enemy leaders should not be tried if they are “sincere 
men”; if they are not, summary execution would be appropriate. Id. at 179–80. He appears to 
condemn Nuremberg as well. Id. at 169. 
 24. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 220. 
 25. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). 
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dangers that are probable but not too remote.26 At the height of the 
Cold War, Judge Hand believed that international (that is, Soviet-
directed) Communism posed just such a danger, and for that reason 
the conviction of the Dennis defendants was justified.27 
Professor Shklar disagrees. Citing Justice Jackson’s opinion on 
appeal, she argues that the political trial corrupts the judiciary: 
The judicial process, Justice Jackson observed, is not designed to 
deal with radical political movements. It deals with individual 
offenders against law, not with the elimination of political groups. 
To attempt such tasks is to injure the judicial process, because the 
principle of legality cannot survive them.28 
This is an argument by definition: because the judicial process is 
designed to enforce the law, it cannot be used to eliminate political 
enemies. But why not? Why can’t it do both? Indeed, Justice Jackson 
concurred with the majority’s affirmance of Judge Hand’s decision, 
apparently because he believed that the challenge posed by 
Communism could be cabined as an international threat: judicial 
persecution of Communists would not necessarily result in judicial 
persecution of legitimate, indigenous opposition groups.29 
The quotation above makes it appear that Professor Shklar 
thinks that courts can convict people only for past acts and not on the 
basis of future threats, but she backs off from that position, which 
would be in tension with her critique of the legalist mentality, and 
instead argues that Judge Hand was wrong about the facts. The threat 
posed by American Communists was remote, not probable; therefore, 
it was wrong to imprison them.30 
If the mobilization of the judiciary were a necessary muting of law in 
time of war one would not complain, especially if this war, like those 
in the past, had a foreseeable end. However, the Cold War is not 
 
 26. Id. at 212. 
 27. Id. at 213. 
 28. See SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 217. 
 29. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that a “rule of reason” will distinguish between a “danger of substantive evil or a 
harmless letting off of steam”). That Communists ought to be granted a lower level of process 
was apparently a general view of the Supreme Court. See William M. Wiecek, The Legal 
Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 375, 377. This was also the view of President Harry Truman, who “was willing, as 
were some other liberals, to destroy the CPUSA in order to maintain basic liberties of all other 
citizens.” STEINBERG, supra  note 4, at 289. 
 30. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 215. 
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like that, nor does it require the abandonment of the principle of 
legality. This abandonment is a necessity conjured up by an 
abandonment of pragmatic liberalism and a paranoia created by an 
interminable, frustrating, and exhausting conflict.31 
Shklar thus adopts a legalistic solution to the problem of political 
trials: acceptable during wars with a foreseeable end, and not 
otherwise. This position is inconsistent with her critique of legalistic 
thinking. She ought to approve or disapprove of political trials just to 
the extent that they promote liberal values such as tolerance. Such 
liberal values, she concedes, can be promoted only in a society that is 
secure against external and internal threats.32 It follows that a political 
trial that improves security (such as at time of war, but not only then) 
may be justified. She disagrees with Judge Hand about the nature of 
the threat posed by the American Communist Party; it is only this 
disagreement about the facts, and not a philosophical or analytical 
demonstration that the political trial during times of peace is 
inconsistent with liberal values, that drives her critique of Dennis.33 
Indeed, one could argue that the Dennis case was less a political 
trial than the Nuremberg case. As I will discuss below, the promoters 
of the Nuremberg trial sought to persuade the world of the evils of 
the Nazi system and the virtues of the allied states that opposed it. By 
contrast, the Dennis trial was motivated less by partisan goals than by 
the belief that the American Communist Party was providing 
assistance to a dangerous foreign enemy. 
Subsequent writings of political theorists have not departed 
much from Shklar’s conclusions.34 Professors Charles Abel and Frank 
 
 31. Id. at 219. 
 32. Id. at 210. 
 33. History has been kinder to Judge Hand than to Professor Shklar. The disclosure of the 
Venona cables and the opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s revealed that the CPUSA was 
dominated by the Soviet Union and used for espionage purposes, although by the end of World 
War II the effectiveness of the Sovie t espionage network in the United States had been 
undermined by defections, counterintelligence, and purges. HARVEY KLEHR ET AL., THE 
SOVIET WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 4–5 (1998); ALLEN WEINSTEIN & ALEXANDER 
VASSILIEV, THE HAUNTED WOOD 339–44 (1999). 
 34. Otto Kirchheimer’s exhaustive book on political trials, POLITICAL JUSTICE, supra note 
19, is mainly descriptive and analytical—he categorizes political trials, shows how they work, 
illustrates the tensions, and so forth. His few normative comments seem to reflect ambivalence, 
but the main tone is one of distaste. In this way, he anticipates Shklar, though he does not draw 
her dogmatic line around political trials in liberal democracies. Others have defended political 
trials in transitional settings. See, e.g., BASS, supra note 13, at 310 (arguing that war crimes 
tribunals may prevent victims from taking justice into their own hands); WALZER, supra note 
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Marsh argue that political trials may generate good political 
outcomes—the Supreme Court’s contraction of libel law and 
expansion of rights of criminal defendants are among their 
examples—but they define the political trial so broadly as to 
encompass virtually any case in which the court’s political views may 
play a role in the decision, hence virtually all constitutional cases 
decided by the Supreme Court.35 In doing so, they lose sight of the 
classic trial against political dissent, which is the source of so much 
discomfort and which they do not seem to defend. Professor Ron 
Christenson argues that a political trial brings “social contradictions” 
out in the open, where they can be discussed and acknowledged—but, 
whatever one thinks of this theory, it is hardly a reason for a 
government to conduct a political trial when it otherwise would have 
no such inclination.36 
The political science literature is valuable but excessively general 
for my purposes. My concern is with how government can lower 
process protections when justified by security concerns without 
generating suspicions that it is targeting its political opponents. This is 
a question of legal and institutional design.37 
 
10, at 86–89 (approving of the trials of Charles I and Louis XVI for establishing a symbolic 
break with monarchy). 
 35. See generally  CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL 
TRIALS (1994). 
 36. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10. 
 37. The legal literature is also mostly unrelated to the arguments in this Article. The post–
World War II debates about positivism were inspired by political trials, such as the famous 
postwar prosecution of a woman who informed on her husband under Nazi rule in order to get 
rid of him. However, this political trial was the vehicle for investigating the concept of law, and 
the chief figures in the debate—Hart and Fuller—did not discuss how political trials should be 
conducted. Oddly, they both appear to have thought that the trial would be morally justified, 
with the main difference being that Hart thought Germany should pass an ex post facto law 
before prosecuting the woman whereas Fuller thought that the courts should declare Nazi law 
void and enforce the law that existed at the time of the Weimar Republic. Compare H.L.A. 
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 618–21 (1958), 
with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630, 659–60 (1958). It is doubtful that their jurisprudential disagreements could explain 
this disagreement about means. 
Another literature focuses on the choices faced by transitional governments. See 
generally, e.g., MINOW, supra note 15; CLAUS OFFE, VARIETIES OF TRANSITION: THE EAST 
EUROPEAN AND EAST GERMAN EXPERIENCE (1996); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997); RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002); 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
762 (2003). I will address some of the arguments in this literature in Part IV. 
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C. Legal Background 
Political trials need not violate domestic or international law.38 
Consider U.S. law. The U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes one 
type of political trial—the impeachment. Although Article 2, Section 
4 says that the president and other civil officers may be impeached for 
“high crimes and misdemeanors,”39 and one could argue that this 
means that they can be impeached only for criminal viola tions, the 
general view is that impeachment may be based on political 
expediency.40 The articles of impeachment of both Presidents Andrew 
Johnson and Bill Clinton included political as well as legal claims.41 
And many impeachments of judges have been based on political 
charges, such as that of undermining public confidence in the court.42 
The U.S. Constitution does not ban political trials of other public 
officials, nor does it say that such political trials can occur only 
through impeachment proceedings. It also does not ban political trials 
of ordinary citizens. A number of provisions, however, limit the 
government’s ability to conduct political trials.43 
The First Amendment is the basic constraint. It prohibits 
Congress from passing laws against political opposition in general and 
thus from authorizing the prosecution of individuals solely on the 
ground of their opposition to government policy. However, in times 
of stress, the courts have relaxed First Amendment constraints. 
During the Cold War, the Supreme Court permitted a crackdown on 
the American Communist Party, in part because of its connection 
 
 38. I will discuss international law in Part IV. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4. 
 40. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 56–59 (1973). 
 41. See Articles of Impeachment Against Andrew Johnson, art. X, Cong. Globe, 40th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1615 (1868) (“[President Johnson] did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule, 
hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress . . . [and] to impair and destroy the regard and 
respect of all the good people of the United States for the Congress and legislative power 
thereof . . . .”); Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson Clinton, art. IV, H.R. Res. 
611, 105th Cong. (1998) (“William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, 
has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a 
manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the 
United States.”). 
 42. BERGER, supra note 40, at 53–59. 
 43. There are also political trials under the laws of the states, and various state 
constitutional and statutory constraints, which I will ignore. A few examples are discussed in 
BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 223–25, which describes the efforts of state bar associations, 
beginning with Maryland and New York, to secure counsel for accused Communists.  
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with the Soviet threat.44 The Supreme Court subsequently repudiated 
this line of cases, but only after the Cold War had begun to thaw.45 
Current doctrine holds that the government can target political 
opponents only if they cause harm in the course of their political 
activities (such as robbing a bank to finance their party) or pose a 
threat to public order via “imminent lawless action” (such as inciting 
mob violence).46 
A further constraint on political trials is the Due Process Clause, 
which requires the judge to grant the defendant process rights. The 
great importance of the Due Process Clause lies in its restrictions on 
simple fraudulent (or aggressive) conduct on the part of the 
executive. If the defendant has not violated any laws, not even 
generally applicable laws, the government may be tempted to cut 
procedural corners. At the extreme, the government fabricates 
evidence and bullies witnesses. None of this is unknown, but in the 
more common case the defendant’s legal guilt is ambiguous. The 
government may then strengthen its case by withholding information 
from the defendant’s lawyer, forcing the defendant to confess to a 
crime he did not commit or manipulating him into such a confession, 
playing on the fears of the jury, and so forth. The various due process 
and related constitutional rights—to have a lawyer, to have a jury, to 
call witnesses, to examine evidence, to cross-examine witnesses—limit 
this kind of prosecutorial abuse. 
The Due Process Clause does not prohibit prosecutorial 
discretion: prosecutors are free to bring cases against X rather than Y, 
even though they committed the same crimes, or even if Y’s crime is 
 
 44. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951); see also Wiecek, supra  note 29, at 
406–07. 
 45. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303 (1957); see also BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 
157. 
 46. The current doctrine requires “imminent” harm, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969), but that has not always been the case. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
In other democratic countries, such as Germany, which proscribes the Nazi Party, and Turkey, 
which periodically proscribes Islamic parties, there is no such requirement. See John E. Finn, 
Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-democratic Parties, in THE DEMOCRATIC 
EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 51, 70–74 (David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg 
eds., 2001) (listing these proscriptions as well as those in other countries); Walter F. Murphy, 
Excluding Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory , in GERMANY 
AND ITS BASIC LAW 173, 180–87 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (comparing 
German and American policies on excluding certain pa rties from participation in the political 
process). 
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worse.47 The prosecutor might have any number of motives: resource 
constraints and difficulty of proof, the value of making an example of 
one defendant rather than another, and so forth. The Supreme Court 
has held only that the prosecutor’s motive cannot be invidious, and 
this typically means that the prosecutor cannot have racist motives 
(for example) or want to punish a defendant for asserting a legal right 
in a prior case.48 Although bringing prosecutions for political ends 
would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause, courts are so 
deferential—they require proof of the government’s motive rather 
than just a pattern of prosecuting political opponents who happen to 
violate general laws—that there is no discernible restriction on this 
practice.49 
A final important constraint on the political trial in the U.S. is 
structural. The separation of powers requires, in most cases, some 
degree of cooperation among all three branches if a political trial is to 
succeed. Congress can block political trials by declining to enact laws 
that target political opponents, refusing to enact very general laws 
that can be selectively enforced against political opponents, and 
defunding or otherwise constraining executive branch officials and 
judges who favor political trials.50 The executive can undermine 
political prosecutions authorized by Congress by refusing to pursue 
them with zeal, or, when authorized, by establishing regulations that 
constrain its own officials.51 The judiciary can undermine political 
prosecutions by throwing up procedural barriers such as burdens of 
proof, refusing requests for secrecy, and interpreting the 
 
 47. Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1279–83 (2002). 
 48. Id. at 1286–94. 
 49. Id. at 1285–87 & n.651; see, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) 
(upholding prosecution of draft resisters selected because they had expressed an intention not 
to register); United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 311 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding prosecution 
despite prosecution memo that identified the defendant’s political party); see also United States 
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–66 (1996) (describing the high standard for asserting a selective 
prosecution claim). 
 50. However, various administrations have argued that the president’s Article II powers 
authorize him to detain and try enemy combatants without congressional authorization. The 
Supreme Court has, so far, declined to express a view on this argument; for its most recent 
statement, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639–40 (2004).  
 51. A good example of this is the foot-dragging of the acting secretary of labor during the 
Red Scare of the 1920s. Another is Attorney General Biddle’s reluctance to enforce the Smith 
Act during World War II, except when prodded by Roosevelt. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 38–40. 
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constitutional provisions mentioned above in an expansive fashion.52 
As each institution wants to protect itself, and as each institution 
(except for the presidency) is always staffed by members of both 
parties, political trials (at the federal level) of members of mainstream 
parties are rare. Instead, political trials have been conducted mainly 
against people whom both parties regard as political opponents, 
usually extremists at either end of the political spectrum.53 
All of what has been said so far is confined to the American 
experience; political trials in other constitutional democracies are 
usually not as heavily regulated by constitutional provisions or 
tradition. The impeachment power was frequently used by the British 
parliament in its historical efforts to rein in the King; these political 
trials are generally thought to have enhanced liberty and the rule of 
law because they were used against the person who posed the chief 
threat to them. Impeachment was also a powerful tool against official 
corruption in all parts of government. This history influenced the 
drafters of the American Constitution, who included the 
impeachment power in part as a bulwark against the feared 
monarchical tendencies of a president and in part as a lever against 
corruption.54 
Much has been written about impeachment recently,55 and so my 
focus will be on the use of the normal criminal trial for political ends 
in the American system and on international and transitional trials. 
 
 52. For example , Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 310 (1957), narrowed the Smith Act. 
Even before Yates, many trial judges declined to impose the maximum penalty for Smith Act 
violations. BELKNAP, supra  note 4, at 158. 
 53. Such groups have included the American Communist Party, e.g., Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951), and the Ku Klux Klan, e.g., Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 60, 
63 (1928) (upholding a state law that required KKK members to register with the state). The 
view that Reconstruction-era trials of KKK members were political is defended in Kermit L. 
Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 
1871–1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921 (1984). Professor Hall argues that the trials were used to 
consolidate Republican power in the South; however, Hall’s definition of political trial is 
broader than that used here. 
 54. See BERGER, supra note 40, at 7–52; see generally  PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. 
HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805 (1984).  
 55. See generally  WILLIAM REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS (1992); Joseph Isenbergh, 
Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53 
(1999); Cass Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (1998). 
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II.  THEORY 
A. Liberal Legalism 
Legalism is the view that courts should resolve social conflicts by 
applying preexisting rules to the conduct of individuals, who are given 
an opportunity to defend themselves. The defendant has a right to 
make a defense, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, have an 
impartial judge and jury, and so forth. Collectively, this package of 
rights is known as the right to due process. Legalism can be 
understood as the view that the right to judicial process is paramount 
and that due process should never be violated, or violated only in the 
most unusual conditions.56 
Legalism is not incompatible with laws against political 
opposition. A law that bans criticism of the state or government is 
such a law; a court could enforce the law without violating the right to 
judicial process as long as the defendant is given the opportunity to 
mount a defense. The joint commitment to legalism and political 
tolerance is “liberal legalism,” which includes the idea that courts 
should not permit the government to ban political speech or 
opposition except when it causes immediate harm—for example, 
incitement to riot.57 
Political trials cannot occur in a regime of liberal legalism as long 
as legal institutions uphold this ideal. But real democracies only 
approximate liberal legalism; they sometimes enact laws against 
political opposition. Moreover, the more common type of political 
trial occurs when process is relaxed in violation of the ideal of 
legalism so that general laws that do not target political opponents 
can be used as a pretext for doing just that. 
From the perspective of liberal legalism, such trials are 
illegitimate unless, as Professor Shklar suggests, there is something 
like a state of war or civil insurrection. Shklar allows liberal states to 
relax their own principles to defend themselves, but as previously 
noted, she tries to place this exception within a legalistic framework.58 
 
 56. Legalism is more or less synonymous with the notion of the rule of law, though it has a 
pejorative connotation, suggesting excessive concern with following the rules. On this, see the 
essays collected in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra  note 8. 
 57. This seems to be Professor Shklar’s view with respect to the domestic setting, which 
puts great weight on the harm principle. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 60–70. 
 58. Id. at 219–20. 
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If a court determines that a state of war exists, then it might relax the 
rules of process or defer to executive action such as the establishment 
of military commissions.59 Why shouldn’t courts relax process if a 
substantial threat short of war exists? Shklar insists that such thinking 
is “utopian” and unpragmatic and that courts should not be involved 
in deterring mere threats.60 But, she does not persuasively explain 
why relaxing process in this way violates liberal principles. 
B. An Instrumental Theory of Liberal Legalism 
Academic defenders of liberal legalism normally provide 
philosophical justifications for this system, arguing that liberal 
legalism—also called liberal democracy, or constitutional democracy, 
or the rule of law, depending on whether more emphasis is put on 
liberalism or legalism—promotes welfare or fairness, or respects 
human dignity, or maintains social peace more effectively than 
alternative systems.61 Without expressing a view on these approaches, 
I will take a different approach that emphasizes rational choice on the 
part of individuals or groups with power. I approach liberal legalism 
not as a system of values imposed on the government, but as a 
reflection of the principles and attitudes that would be taken by a 
rational government in a democratic system, one that seeks to 
maximize its political support.62 
A government, as I use the term, consists of the people who 
control the policy and activities of the state. In a parliamentary 
system, the government is typically controlled by a single party or a 
coalition of parties; the opposition, then, consists of the party or 
parties that are out of power. In a presidential system, the 
government is typically controlled by the president’s party, but the 
president may be forced to share power with opposition parties if 
they control the legislature. In any event, I want to distinguish, very 
 
 59. The lure of legalism remains, however, as can be seen in the judicial response to the 
War on Terror. For example, contrast the government’s view that it can classify individuals, 
including Americans, as enemy combatants with virtually no judicial oversight (a view endorsed 
by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2683 (2004)), and detain 
them for the duration of hostilities, and the Hamdi plurality’s view that a person classified as an 
enemy combatant is entitled to due process protections if the classification is contested, id. at 
2645–52. 
 60. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 214–15, 217–19. 
 61. See generally ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. 
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). 
 62. This is roughly the approach of Holmes, supra  note 8, and Przeworski, supra note 8. 
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roughly, the “majority party” or “party in power” from the 
(mainstream) “opposition party.” In liberal democracies, the various 
mainstream parties compete for power within a legal framework; the 
opposition party is not outlawed or forced to suffer legal disabilities. 
In some democracies, extremist parties may be outlawed or regulated; 
in others, they may be able to share power. 
I assume that the government’s main goal is to stay in power, and 
that a party’s main goal is either to maintain power (if it has it) or 
obtain power (if it does not). All political actors know that they 
cannot maintain power unless they implement policies desired by the 
general public, including (but not exclusively) their political base. 
One such policy is security, broadly conceived. Virtually every 
member of the public seeks security both against internal threats such 
as those posed by criminal activity and against external threats such 
as invasion by hostile foreign countries. 
It might seem that the best way to deter crime is to deny all rights 
to criminals, and simply seize and punish anyone who has committed 
a crime. Once the police have satisfied themselves that a particular 
person committed a crime, they would punish the individual without 
going through the risky and tedious business of a trial. The usual 
objections to this approach are that trials promote fairness and 
accuracy and that they prevent the government from arresting and 
convicting people who are vulnerable but did not commit any crime, 
so as to make a show of responding to the public’s fear of crime 
without having to expend resources on a criminal investigation. But 
these objections are not persuasive. If law enforcement routinely 
convicts the wrong people, then criminals will be encouraged rather 
than deterred. If the government cannot keep criminal behavior at a 
low level, it will lose public support. 
The main problem with denying procedural protections to 
criminal defendants is that without such protections the government 
can use its monopoly on force to harass, detain, or eliminate its 
political opponents. Authoritarian countries, in fact, frequently do 
this, but liberal democracies do not. Why not? 
The tempting answer is “the courts”: independent courts prevent 
governments in liberal democracies from suppressing political 
opposition. The problem with this answer is that many authoritarian 
countries do have courts, and the courts of many liberal democracies 
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are not independent.63 The answer also begs the question why 
governments bent on suppressing political opposition do not push 
courts out of their way; this is exactly what happens in weak 
democracies. The question, then, can be reframed as follows: why do 
governments in liberal democracies with weak courts restrain 
themselves from suppressing political opposition, and why do 
governments in liberal democracies restrain themselves from 
undermining strong courts so that they can suppress political 
opposition? 
The better answer is that a government that depends on the 
consent of the public cannot take the risk of allowing the public to 
think that the government eliminates political opponents who enjoy 
the support of at least some of the public. Any particular criminal 
defendant may be an ordinary criminal, but the defendant may also 
be an attractive political target because of his or her leadership of, or 
membership in, the opposition party, or because the defendant’s 
activities have symbolic importance for the opposition party. The 
public, especially the leaders and members of the opposition political 
party, will sometimes not know with confidence whether the 
government targets a particular criminal defendant because the 
defendant has actually committed crimes or poses a threat to security 
or because he or she poses a mere political (or partisan) threat to the 
government or party in power. If the public does not know whether 
the government uses its monopoly on power to target political 
opponents, or if it believes that the government does, it may withdraw 
support from the existing government and look for alternatives. The 
reason is that a government that uses force against opponents rather 
than criminals is not providing maximum security, and indeed may be 
pursuing policies that benefit the government itself or its circle of 
supporters rather than the public at large. 
The problem is one of asymmetric information, and the historic 
solution in Western states is liberal legalism. There are two points 
here. First, liberalism forbids the criminalization of political 
opposition, and it manifests itself in formal law as freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and the other basic political rights. A 
government that voluntarily consents to laws that protect opposition 
parties has taken the first step toward showing that it is a government 
 
 63. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 
721–22 (1994). 
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that serves the public interest. Such a government maintains its power 
not by intimidating political opponents, but by creating good policy 
that pleases the public, which will reward the government by 
returning it to power. 
Second, legalism ensures that the government will not 
circumvent the basic political rights through subterfuge. The judicial 
process forces the government to show that the defendant is an actual 
criminal or public threat, not just a political opponent. The 
government must show that the defendant has violated a law—that is, 
a rule with democratic credentials. The government must persuade an 
independent judge and jury that the defendant violated the law. Rules 
of evidence and publicity ensure that the public can evaluate the 
government’s case. Legalism prevents the typical subterfuge by which 
a government targets political opponents not by eliminating them or 
outlawing their parties but by accusing them of committing crimes 
that they did not commit or of crimes that are not generally enforced. 
None of this suggests that a government will always adopt liberal 
legalism, or that liberal legalism is necessarily self-perpetuating. If a 
government believes that its political opponents are likely to win the 
next election, the government might think that it has little to lose by 
prosecuting them. In the United States, this occurred only once—and 
while it was still an unstable quasi democracy—during the Sedition 
Act trials of the late eighteenth century, when Federalists used the 
judicial process to fend off political attacks by Republican 
newspapers.64 In stable democracies, the reason that such trials do not 
occur more often is that the reputational cost is so high: a party that 
uses its control over government to prosecute its political opponents 
will lose public support. Indeed, the Sedition Act prosecutions 
backfired, made martyrs of Republican writers and editors, and 
contributed to the defeat of the Federalists. The experiment would 
not be repeated.65 
In sum, governments grant judicial process and refrain from 
banning political opposition as a way of showing that their policies 
are in the public interest. When this kind of self-restraint becomes 
entrenched in a society, the state is both liberal and legalistic. A 
 
 64. SMITH, supra  note 4, at 186. 
 65. Id. at 431. Smith provides several examples that show that defendants convicted of 
Sedition Act violations often became heroes; in one case, the defendant was an elected official 
who was rewarded with reelection after he was released from prison. See, e.g., id. at 238, 241, 
244, 274, 395. 
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government that goes to the trouble of eliminating its political 
opponents does so only because it fears that these opponents are 
likely to attract followers, which can be the case only if a large 
segment of the public can be persuaded that the government’s 
policies do not benefit it or are otherwise wrong or unjust. If this is 
the case, the elimination of political opponents—however attractive 
for narrow political reasons—is likely to give rise to the inference that 
the government’s policies are bad and thus to result in a loss of 
political support. 
This theory is not incompatible with the philosophical view that 
political rights and judicial process are necessary because of fairness 
or to show respect for human dignity. Indeed, the instrumental theory 
of liberal legalism shows why a power-maximizing government will 
adopt liberal policies that many people find attractive on normative 
grounds. It thus shows why liberal legalism is politically robust, why 
governments sometimes voluntary introduce liberal reforms, and why 
liberal legalism can be attractive to governments in societies (such as 
Japan) that do not have a long liberal tradition but instead emphasize 
the collective good. The theory also shows why liberal legalism faces 
limits, the subject of the next Section. 
C. Departures from Liberal Legalism: Political Trials 
If liberal legalism has instrumental value for governments in the 
way that I have described, then governments will be tempted to 
depart from liberal legalism under two conditions. First, the 
government faces an unusually dangerous threat that cannot be 
adequately addressed within the existing legal framework. Second, 
the government enjoys an unusually high level of trust among 
citizens, so that it need not worry too much about creating suspicions 
by denying process in selected cases. 
As to the first point, a government knows that if it cannot protect 
the people, they will eventually withdraw support. So its priority is 
security. Threats to security can be purely internal but can also be 
external. The normal internal threat is everyday crime. Many 
governments can keep crime at tolerable levels without departing 
from liberal legalism. To be sure, the norms of legal liberalism are not 
rigid and are relaxed or tightened incrementally as circumstances 
warrant. When crime increases as a result of an exogenous shock—
new drugs, new technologies—authorities almost always pass laws or 
take actions that depart incrementally from liberal legalism. The drug 
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crisis stemming from the spread of crack cocaine led to a relaxation of 
liberal legalism across several dimensions: (1) vague laws that enabled 
prosecutors to target the most dangerous criminals, (2) broad 
complicity rules that enabled prosecutors to reach all members of a 
drug gang, and (3) antiassociation laws that enabled police to prevent 
congregation of gang members on the street.66 But the more 
significant test for liberal legalism is terrorism or domestic insurgency, 
and here most liberal states have departed much farther from liberal 
legalism, usually for the duration of the crisis, by claiming broad 
powers to be exercised only against the terrorist threat.67 
An even more important test of a government’s commitment to 
liberal legalism is the external threat. During wartime, virtually all 
legal protections may be suspended and military rule imposed, 
depending on the extent of the threat. In the United States, the Civil 
War resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus, World War I in 
aggressive sedition laws, and World War II in martial law in Hawaii 
and the relocation of Americans of Japanese ancestry on the 
mainland.68 Soviet-led international Communism furnished ample 
reason, in the minds of American authorities, for relaxing liberal 
legalism in the 1920s and again in the 1950s. Today, Islamic terrorism 
is the chief external threat to American security and the excuse for 
relaxing process protections. 
As to the second point, when people believe that the government 
does not seek to eliminate its opponents, they are more likely to 
tolerate reductions in process: although reducing process may 
enhance error, this by itself will not disadvantage opponents or 
entrench the existing authorities. One common method that 
governments use to enhance trust during eme rgencies is to invite 
political opponents into the government itself. Parliamentary systems 
often produce war cabinets with representatives from the party that is 
out of power. In the United States, the most famous example is the 
participation of the Republicans Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox 
in Franklin Roosevelt’s cabinet during World War II. Members of the 
opposition political party with knowledge of the internal workings of 
 
 66. There is a large literature on this topic. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, 
Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (gang loitering 
laws); Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2004) (vague laws). 
 67. See POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra  note 10, at 20–23 (Baader-Meinhof Gang); 
id. at 168–71 (Irish Republican Army). 
 68. See generally STONE, supra  note 4, for a recent discussion. 
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the government can be expected to raise a fuss if they discover the 
government is using its emergency powers to persecute their 
colleagues and supporters.69 
Let me put the argument in a more stylized form. Suppose that 
the possible defendant in a criminal trial—if not simply an ordinary 
criminal—may be either a “public threat” or a “political opponent” of 
the government. A public threat is a person, such as a terrorist, who is 
likely to harm the general public or the constitutional system; a 
political opponent is a person who poses a threat to an existing 
government but not to the public—the case of normal political 
opposition. Because the public threat has not committed any crime, 
the defendant cannot be convicted of a crime if given normal, that is, 
“high,” process. Assume that conviction is possible if the defendant is 
given “low” process. 
When the government uses high process, people who are public 
threats, or are suspected of being public threats, are acquitted and set 
free. If they engage in terrorist attacks or support subversion, the 
public will react by saying to the government, “If you cannot protect 
us, we’ll find another (less scrupulous) government that will.” The 
dilemma faced by the government is that it might, with the 
acquiescence of the courts,70 rationally grant a low amount of process 
in response, allowing it to convict public threats. But at the same 
time, the government knows that if it uses low process, the public will 
begin to suspect that the government may be targeting political 
opponents. As long as the public assumes that the government is 
using low process to eliminate political opponents, the government 
has nothing to lose and much to gain from actually doing so.71 And 
 
 69. In the United States, the executive branch might also seek broad support from 
Congress, as emphasized by Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil 
Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during 
Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 4, at 161, 187–94, and by Professor 
Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 75–77. However, given that the 
problem of distrust is partisan rather than institutional, I would argue that it was more 
important for Roosevelt to appoint Knox and Stimson to his cabinet than for him to obtain the 
acquiescence of the Democratic Congress. 
 70. I will discuss later the extent to which governments can expect judges to acquiesce in 
this way. See Part III.C. For now, assume that judges will do what they think the government 
wants them to do. 
 71. See Finn, supra note 46, at 66. Discussing the World War I trials, Professor Peterson 
notes that “it is a fact that almost immediately after the beginning of World War I people of the 
political right used the war as an excuse to attack people of the left. They did so by accusing 
leftists of being disloyal.” PETERSON & FITE, supra note 4, at 45; see also id. at 213–21 
(discussing the way the sedition law was used against leftist groups). 
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the public might rationally tolerate low process if the public threat is 
serious enough. So, the government must choose between 
maintaining high process, addressing the threat inadequately, and 
then risking public support because of security concerns, or reducing 
process, addressing the threat properly, but risking public support 
because of the perceived reduction in political competition. And 
although the ability to target political opponents using low process 
may help the government maintain its power, this advantage may not 
compensate for the loss of public confidence. 
There may be other ways for government to finesse these 
difficulties. Instead of granting low process to all criminal defendants, 
it could offer high process to “ordinary” criminals and low process to 
a class of people whom the public believes more likely to pose a real 
threat. The American government, in fact, has done this quite 
frequently, granting lower process to aliens, people who openly 
identify themselves with extremist groups (Communists, Islamic 
fundamentalists), and enemy soldiers.72 These people may also be 
subject to greater surveillance than ordinary citizens. The government 
can also grant higher-than-normal process to people who belong to 
mainstream opposition parties; this helps avoid the inference that the 
government’s motives are narrowly political. 
To summarize the argument thus far, one can imagine the 
following sequence of events. First, some emergency or apparent 
emergency occurs, and the public demands protection against the real 
or imaginary threat. Second, the government responds by reducing 
procedural protections. At one extreme, it might suspend habeas 
corpus and declare martial law. But the reduction of procedural 
protections could take subtler forms: the enactment of new laws, or 
the invocation of long dormant ones, that target seditious, disloyal, or 
dangerous behavior; reliance on newly broad interpretations of 
existing laws allowing their use against the perceived threats; refusal 
by judges and juries to give certain types of defendants the benefit of 
the doubt; relaxed evidentiary standards; restrictions on defense 
lawyers’ access to their clients; and so forth. Third, the government 
now has greater freedom of action, which it can use against political 
opponents as well as the people who pose the new public threat. A 
rational, power-maximizing government will use its freedom of action 
 
 72. This was Justice Jackson’s argument in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567–69 
(1951). See supra  note 29 and accompanying text. On trials of enemy soldiers, see Part IV.A 
infra . 
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to pursue both types of person. Fourth, the public realizes that the 
government can use its freedom of action against partisan opponents 
as well as public threats. The public may partially or fully withdraw 
support from the government because it fears political persecution of 
marginal or even mainstream political opponents of the government, 
but it also may accept this reduction in political competition as an 
acceptable price to pay for enhanced security. Defendants in criminal 
trials will exploit this public unease and claim to be political 
opponents (when such a claim is plausible) whether or not they in fact 
are. Critics of the government will call these “political trials.” 
At this point, it might be useful to return to the definition of the 
political trial. “Political trial” is usually used as an epithet, and so it is 
tempting to stipulate that a trial is political only if the government 
uses its freedom of action to target political opponents rather than 
genuine public threats. Partisan trials are almost always objectionable 
because they violate the principle of political competition at the heart 
of liberal democracy. One could adopt this narrow definition of 
political trial, but then one would need a word for criminal trials of 
defendants who are not merely political opponents but are in fact also 
public threats—threats to the entire constitutional system or to the 
well-being of many people—who have not committed ordinary 
crimes. The better approach is to use a broad definition of political 
trial, a definition that encompasses both the partisan trial of political 
opponents and the more public-spirited trial of public threats. The 
reason is that the latter type of trial violates the rule of law: it is 
political, not legal, albeit political in the broader, less objectionable 
sense—a matter of (possibly wise) policy rather than a vindication of 
the law. A further reason for using the broad definition is that most 
relevant trials fall between the two extremes: anarchist, Communist, 
or Islamic terrorists are both political opponents in the narrow sense 
and also threats (even if remote and long term) to the constitutional 
system. The final and decisive reason for using the broad definition is 
that the political trial (in the broad sense) creates institutional design 
challenges that the ordinary criminal trial does not. For example, a 
judge who presides over political trials might appropriately change 
the rules of process to interfere with partisan prosecutions while 
permitting convictions of public threats. 
Political trials can be contrasted with show trials, such as those 
conducted by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and many Soviet 
satellites. Defendants were tortured or threatened offstage, then at 
trial would confess to whatever crimes the government charged them 
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with, so as to avoid being tortured or shot afterwards and to spare 
their families the same fate. The defendants were, in effect, unpaid 
actors in a propaganda film. Show tria ls cut the Gordian knot: 
governments eliminate partisan opponents as well as public threats 
without losing public support through the simple expedient of only 
pretending that they grant process protections. If the public believes 
the government, the government’s problems are solved.73 But the 
pretense cannot be maintained indefinitely even in an authoritarian 
state, and show trials usually stop after a few years. Show trials are 
not an option in an open society because they would require the 
collaboration of people with different political views and goals—
prosecutors, judges, lawyers, juries—or else the wholesale destruction 
of existing institutions, which itself would alert people to the 
government’s intentions.74 
D. Summary, Evidence, Implications 
Liberal legalism is an instrumental strategy used by governments 
to maximize political support in societies that have a general interest 
in security but tolerate normal political opposition. Liberal legalism 
enables the government to minimize internal threats to public 
security to the largest extent possible, consistent with the need to 
reassure the public that it will not maintain its power by harassing 
political opponents. When security threats increase, the government 
 
 73. Some people might argue that the purpose of show trials is to instill fear and intimidate 
the public, which is supposed to know that the defendant’s confession was the result of torture, 
and thus that torture is the punishment for political opposition. This is, at best, a small portion 
of the truth: disappearances or, for that matter, overt violence against political opponents would 
have served (and did serve) the purpose of intimidation. The great show trials in the Soviet 
Union had the specific purpose of discrediting Stalin’s opponents, intended for foreign as well as 
domestic audiences (foreign journalists were invited to attend the trials). The trials did not fool 
everyone in the West, as the charges were often absurd, and some of the facts asserted in the 
trials could be checked out and disproved. But they did fool many influential people in the 
West, including politicians, journalists, artists, and intellectuals. See ROBERT CONQUEST, THE 
GREAT TERROR 91 (1990) (describing foreign observers at the trial of the old Bolsheviks); id. at 
105–08 (describing the Western reception of the trial); id. at 463–76 (describing the Western 
reaction to all of the trials of the 1936–1938 period). 
 74. There is a sliding scale, and some devices used in a political trial can make it hard to 
distinguish from a show trial. In France, the “amalgam” was a device for associating a political 
opponent with ordinary criminals with whom the defendant never conspired but shared some 
superficial similarity. One trial in 1894 brought together some anarchists, whose offense was 
only political, with ordinary criminals, who justified their crimes using anarchist rhetoric but 
who otherwise had no association with the political defendants. KIRCHHEIMER, supra  note 34, 
at 196 & n.40. The fiction here was more than the court could tolerate. 
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departs incrementally from liberal legalism because the public in such 
times is willing to tolerate a marginal increase in the harassment of 
(usually extreme) political opponents in return for greater security. 
As a result, political trials occur. These trials may target both 
authentic public threats and partisan political opponents. If the gain 
in security is large enough that the public as a whole benefits, even 
though the government can increasingly use political trials to enhance 
its power, then erosion of liberal legalism is likely to be tolerated, at 
least for the duration of the emergency.75 
The history of political trials in the United States supports the 
thesis that in a liberal democracy, political trials are more likely to be 
(politically) successful when defendants are extremists than when 
they are mainstream opponents. The Sedition Act trials of 
Jeffersonian Republicans were a spectacular failure: rather than 
destroy the Republicans, they destroyed the Fe deralists.76 The 
impeachment of Federalist Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, this time at 
the instigation of Republicans, was another failure.77 These failures 
helped establish the legitimacy of political competition between 
mainstream parties in the United States;78 the implicit bargain—that 
the judicial process will not be used against mainstream partisan 
opponents—has held, more or less, for two hundred years. 
Subsequent political trials can be divided into two categories. 
First, there were trials of people who had virtually no mainstream 
political support: anarchists, Nazi sympathizers, and Communists. 
Although the trials of these people often took place in a circuslike 
atmosphere, the evidence suggests that the public approved of the 
trials and convictions and that the political standing of the 
 
 75. A complementary philosophical treatment can be found in JOHN E. FINN, 
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1991). Professor 
Finn argues that, during eme rgencies, the commitment to constitutionalism can be maintained, 
even as a particular constitution’s requirements are evaded, as long as certain elemental 
requirements of constitutionalism—reason, deliberation, etc.—are satisfied. Id. at 5–7. 
 76. SMITH, supra  note 4, at 432–33. 
 77. A more ambiguous example is the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. See POLITICAL 
TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 47–50. Burr was a political enemy of Jefferson, but by 
1807 he probably could not be considered a part of the mainstream opposition. However, 
Justice Marshall, who derailed the trial by defining “treason” narrowly, was. But see Robert K. 
Faulkner, John Marshall and the Burr Trial, 53 J. AM. HIST. 247, 247 (1966) (criticizing the view 
that Marshall’s interpretation of treason law showed political bias). 
 78. See Richard E. Ellis, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE 
YOUNG REPUBLIC 278–79 (1971). 
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government improved as a result of them.79 Second, there were trials 
of people whose views were somewhere between moderate and 
extreme: opponents of the Civil War, World War I, and the Vie tnam 
War. These trials were only moderately successful, as one might 
expect. Civil War–era military trials of dissenters may have 
maintained order but were highly controversial and politically 
damaging.80 World War I–era espionage and sedition prosecutions 
were popular and may have helped the war effort, but they also 
enhanced the prestige of radical politicians like Eugene Debs.81 
Vietnam War–era prosecutions like the Chicago 8 trial seem to have 
both discouraged violent protests and weakened support for the 
national government and its policies.82 
Use of political trials only against serious public threats, and not 
as a routine weapon against political opponents, can reflect self-
restraint by prosecuting authorities, and need not be imposed by third 
parties such as courts. The history of Great Britain supports this 
proposition, as does self-restraint in the use of the impeachment 
power in the United States.83 For that matter, so does the self-
restraint of executive branch officials, even when there has been 
short-term public support for political trials. However, in the United 
States, the judiciary has a great deal of prestige, and it can interfere 
with political trials that the government is inclined to pursue. Thus, it 
is useful to consider the perspective of the judge and ask how judges 
 
 79. See, e.g., AVRICH, supra note 10, at 280–85 (anarchists); BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 113 
(Communists). However, it is important to note that these trials created a political backlash. 
Several of the Haymarket defendants were ultimately pardoned, and the trial radicalized many 
workers. See AVRICH, supra note 10, at 307–12 (after trial); id. at 409–14 (after executions); id. 
at 433–36 (long-term effect). 
 80. During the Civil War, a large number of Northerners suspected of Southern sympathies 
were detained by the military, with no judicial process. The precise number is unknown, but it 
was probably in the hundreds (if one limits oneself to the clearest cases) or thousands 
(especially if one includes draft resisters, unexplained arrests, and so forth). See MARK E. 
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 51–65, 113–38 
(1991) (describing arrests and detentions). Detainees did receive military hearings, which 
involved regular procedures. Id. at 162–75. 
 81. Harold Josephson, Political Justice During the Red Scare: The Trial of Benjamin Gitlow, 
in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, supra  note 10, at 154 (“[T]he trials . . . created martyrs and 
enabled radicals to use the issues of freedom of speech and political liberty to rally broad liberal 
support to their cause.”).  
 82. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, 
supra note 10, at 249 (“[T]he defendants’ effort to appeal over the court to the general public 
seemingly fell on deaf ears.”). 
 83. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 54, at 3–8 (discussing Great Britain), 256–63 
(discussing early state and federal impeachments in the United States). 
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manage a criminal trial that is, or might be, motivated by the political 
goals of the government. 
III.  DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
A political trial balances two values: the value of convicting a 
defendant who poses a risk to the government or the public and the 
value of maintaining the public’s confidence that the government 
does not target political opponents. Ordinary judicial process, 
involving relatively specific laws that prohibit harmful behavior, 
reflects the weight of the second value. The question raised by the 
political trial is whether process should be relaxed (or enhanced), and 
in what ways. This Part illustrates the trade-offs involved, focusing on 
laws against political opposition; charges and evidence; the roles of 
the judge, jury, and defense lawyer; and control of publicity. When 
lawyers think of these design elements, they usually focus on the 
trade-off between accuracy in determining guilt (convicting the guilty, 
not the innocent) and administrative cost (perfect accuracy can be 
purchased only at infinite expense). The focus here is instead on the 
trade-off between accuracy in evaluating the threat (convicting 
dangerous people, not mere political opponents or critics) and 
maintaining the credibility of the government. 
A. Laws against Political Opposition 
The most recognizable political trial is an ordinary trial for 
violation of a law that prohibits political opposition to the 
government. Authoritarian states have often enacted such laws. The 
law might prohibit the formation of political parties aside from the 
ruling party, any kind of political activity that opposes the 
government, subversive activity, advocacy of policies that are 
contrary to government policies, and so forth. A trial in which all the 
forms of legality are respected would nonetheless result in the 
conviction of a defendant because of political views or activities. 
Liberal democracies do not have laws prohibiting mainstream 
political opposition: tolerance of formal political opposition is the key 
distinction between the liberal democratic system and the 
authoritarian system. But the amount of tolerance is not absolute. 
Turkey—whose democratic credentials are solid but not perfect—
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bans fundamentalist Islamic parties.84 Germany prohibits parties that 
oppose its constitutional system.85 Other democracies have similar 
bans on extremist parties and subversive activities that are contrary to 
the constitutional order.86 Thus, they make a distinction between 
mainstream political dissent, which is tolerated, and constitutional 
dissent, which is not. 
In the United States, there have been five overt attempts to 
suppress political dissent. The Sedition Act of 1798 prohibited “false, 
scandalous and malicious” statements about the government, but it 
was interpreted broadly so that it could be used to prosecute 
mainstream Republican opponents of the John Adams 
administration.87 Martial law during the Civil War permitted the 
military to try and punish people who criticized the Lincoln 
administration’s conduct of the war.88 The Espionage and Sedition 
Acts of 1917–1918 were directed against obstruction of recruitment 
and interference with the military, but they were broadly interpreted 
to prohibit criticism of American participation in World War I.89 The 
Smith Act of 1940 prohibited advocacy of violent revolution against 
the government and was also interpreted broadly until 1957.90 The 
Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954 
“effectively criminalized the Communist party.”91 Of these cases, only 
the Sedition Act of 1798 was, as interpreted by judges, a clear effort 
to suppress dissent by a mainstream group. The Espionage and 
Sedition Acts and the Smith Act targeted extremists, although these 
extremists did include prominent people (such as Eugene Debs) who 
had large followings. The Civil War case is ambiguous. 
Why would a government prosecute members of fringe parties or 
people with idiosyncratic political beliefs? By assumption, these 
 
 84. BEVERLEY MILTON-EDWARDS, ISLAM & POLITICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 
73 (2004). 
 85. See Finn, supra  note 46, at 56 (quoting Article 21(2) of the German Constitution: 
“Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or 
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, shall be unconstitutional . . . .”). 
 86. Id. at 70–74 (describing laws of Chile, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Portugal, Romania, and Rwanda).  
 87. SMITH, supra  note 4, at 94–95, 176–87. 
 88. See RANDALL, supra  note 10, at 177–85. 
 89. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–98. 
 90. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 337 (1957).  
 91. Finn, supra  note 46, at 60. 
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people do not pose a threat, or much of a threat, to the political 
dominance of the government. One reason is that such people may be 
dangerous to the public. The U.S. government prosecuted 
Communists not because they posed an electoral threat but because 
they were loyal to America’s enemy, the Soviet Union.92 The U.S. 
government currently pursues al Qaeda sympathizers because they 
might provide money, shelter, or other support to actual terrorists. If 
the evidence of criminal behavior is not strong, the government 
moves against these people based on an assessment of the risks. A 
Communist ideologue might be a spy or know a spy.93 An al Qaeda 
sympathizer—especially one with a great deal of wealth and ties to 
fundamentalist Islamic groups—is a risk even if he or she has not 
committed a crime or, given the standards of criminal law, cannot be 
proven to have committed a crime. Such a sympathizer may also 
demoralize the public by cheering on terrorist attacks, thereby 
creating an atmosphere of insecurity. Thus, people with extreme 
antigovernment beliefs are more likely to be public threats than 
people without such beliefs—even ordinary criminals—and for this 
reason governments may seek to prosecute them.  
To prosecute such people without violating due process, the 
government would need to rely on laws that directly prohibited such 
activity. As discussed earlier there are, and have been, many such 
laws—against subversion, conspiracy to violate the law, and the like—
but these laws have proven to be unpopular.94 The problem with 
criminalizing membership in a particular organization like the 
American Communist Party is that members can easily evade the law 
by disbanding the proscribed organization and setting up a new one. 
If broader laws are used, and all seditious organizations or activities 
are prohibited, then mainstream organizations can too easily be swept 
within their net, a possibility that inevitably provokes widespread 
political opposition—understandably so, as the government may find 
itself unable to resist the temptation to enforce the laws against 
mainstream political opponents. 
If a government cannot enact laws against political opposition, 
then it will find itself hampered in its efforts to prosecute public 
 
 92. STONE, supra note 4, at 410. 
 93. The Soviets preferred agents with an ideological motivation because they were more 
reliable than paid agents. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 419. 
 94. SMITH, supra note 4, at 431–37; POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–
98. 
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threats who have not engaged in clearly illegal or violent acts. Its best 
hope is to bring charges under a general law against disorderly or 
subversive behavior,95 or even unrelated laws against, say, wire fraud 
or extortion,96 and then to persuade the judge to acquiesce in 
restrictions on process. These restrictions are the hallmark of political 
trials in liberal democracies and the focus of the next several sections. 
B. Charges, Defense, and Evidence 
Legalism requires that defendants be charged with the violation 
of an existing law; be informed of the charges against them, so that 
they may prepare a defense; and be given access to evidence, so that 
they may prove their case. 
All of these elements of normal process interfere with the 
prosecution of public threats. If the government does not have laws 
against political or ideological opposition, it will not be able to apply 
generally applicable rules against criminal behavior to people who 
have not yet caused a harm or who are not on the verge of doing so. If 
the government must candidly inform defendants that it has no legal 
case against them, they will be able to make a plausible argument that 
the trial is political. And the government may not be able to reveal 
evidence that the defendants are a public threat without 
compromising intelligence assets and harming security. In the 
Rosenberg case, for example, some of the government’s evidence 
came from secret cable intercepts that, if revealed, would have 
permitted the Soviet Union to destroy valuable intelligence assets.97 
The problem for the government is that if it denies process—for 
 
 95. General laws against disorderly and similar behavior that could sweep in political 
activity are politically acceptable for familiar reasons: laws that are prospective and general 
cannot be easily used against political opponents as they might sweep in political supporters as 
well. See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 
408–15 (2001). 
 96. Many scholars have noted that many federal (as well as state) laws are so broad and 
vague that they can be used to criminalize almost any tort or even breach of contract. See, e.g., 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 202–13 (1991) (discussing wire 
fraud and the Hobbs Act). The effect of these laws is to give prosecutors a great deal of 
discretion. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and 
Enforcement Decision, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 758–60, 789–814 (1999) (discussing institutional 
mechanisms for limiting prosecutorial discretion); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–19, 529–46 (2001) (discussing the reasons why 
various political actors and interest groups prefer broad criminal laws). 
 97. RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE xv–xxii (2d ed. 1997) 
(discussing the Venona project).  
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example, if it tries defendants in secret to determine whether they are 
a public threat—then it risks losing its credibility. 
The government reduces these tensions in several ways. 
Selective prosecution. First, the government prosecutes public 
threats, when possible, for violating generally applicable laws—laws 
against conspiracy, disorderly conduct, subversion, trespass, 
incitement to riot, and so forth—that are not usually enforced against 
ordinary people who do the things that the actual defendant did. This 
approach is very much a compromise. On the one hand, the public 
will be suspicious of the government because selective prosecution 
can be used against political opponents. On the other, the harm to the 
government’s reputation is mitigated by the facts that the generally 
applicable laws have received public approval and that political 
opponents can maintain their freedom by complying with these laws. 
There may be a special hardship in complying with nanny taxes, 
sodomy laws, and conspiracy laws to which no one else pays 
attention, but it is not as bad as prosecution unconstrained by the law. 
In addition, general laws often have lower sentences precisely 
because they can be applied against so many people, so the 
corresponding risk to political opposition is lessened.  
Consider the following examples. In the prosecution of LeRoi 
Jones in 1967, “it was uncertain whether Jones was on trial for a 
stated or implied charge—for having possessed [two revolvers], or for 
having been responsible, in some mysterious way, for the riots that 
had engulfed Newark.”98 The Chicago 8 were tried for conspiracy to 
incite riots, but the prosecution’s real motivation was to suppress the 
defendants’ vigorous and effective opposition to government policy 
and to make an example of them. The East German head of 
intelligence—to take an example from a transitional trial—was tried 
for a murder he committed sixty years earlier; his real crime was his 
leadership of East German intelligence.99 
An extreme example comes from the Haymarket trial. The 
defendants had advocated violent revolution, but no evidence linked 
them to the bomb thrower (never caught) who killed the police 
officers.100 The judge instructed the jury that the defendants could be 
 
 98. Kenneth M. Dolbeare & Joel B. Grossman, LeRoi Jones in Newark: A Political Trial? , 
in THEODORE LEWIS BECKER, POLITICAL TRIALS, 227–32 (1971). 
 99. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 817. 
 100. See AVRICH, supra  note 10, at 268–75 (describing unsuccessful attempts to link the 
defendants to the unidentified bomb thrower). 
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convicted if they “by print or speech advised, or encouraged the 
commission of murder, without designating time, place or occasion at 
which it should be done.”101 The government sought to disrupt the 
anarchist movement, and the murder became the occasion for 
eliminating several of its leaders and frightening its members. 
Governments can rarely be completely candid in political trials 
because they do not want to admit that the trial violates due process, 
even if the violation is justified for reasons of public security. Instead, 
governments accuse the defendant of violating a general law, while 
also arguing that the acute danger posed by the defendant justifies a 
harsh sentence. Defendants might complain that, if they do not know 
the real reason that the government is prosecuting them, they cannot 
mount an effective defense. LeRoi Jones could have argued that he 
could not defend himself if he thought the government was 
prosecuting him for gun possession, when in fact the judge and jury 
would have convicted him if they thought he caused the Newark riots. 
Partial sharing of evidence. Second, the government may be 
willing to reveal classified evidence to the judge or the defense lawyer 
as long as it is not shared with the defendant. The defendant could 
legitimately object that he or she will not be able to mount a sufficient 
defense without having access to the information; he may not be able 
to provide relevant mitigating evidence to his lawyer or the judge 
unless he knows about the apparently inculpatory classified evidence. 
Further, the public might believe that the evidence is not inculpatory 
and that the defendant is merely a political opponent. One solution is 
to shift the burden to the judge (or to the defense lawyer) in the hope 
that the public will believe that the judge will evaluate the evidence 
impartially and can evaluate it correctly without hearing the response 
of the defendant. This solution can be effective—in the sense of 
maintaining the government’s credibility while allowing it to convict 
the defendant—only if the public believes that the judge is impartial 
and the defendant’s inability to respond to the evidence does not 
undermine the defendant’s ability to mount a defense. But then the 
question becomes, why should the public trust the judge? I return to 
this question in Section C. 
Political defenses. Third, the court, with or without the 
government’s acquiescence, may allow the defendant to assert a 
political defense. Ordinary criminal defendants are rarely permitted 
 
 101. Id. at 277. 
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to argue that their crimes were justified because the government is 
evil. There is no reason for an ordinary criminal trial to become a 
forum for evaluating the government’s policies. But when the public 
suspects that the defendant is being prosecuted for political views, it 
may make sense to allow the defendant to mount a political defense. 
If his or her views are extreme—for example, the defendant is an 
anarchist who thinks that terrorism is justified—then the public will 
be more likely to support the prosecution. If his or her views are 
moderate, then it will be more likely that the defendant is not a public 
threat and that the government’s motives are partisan. Thus, by 
allowing defendants to make political statements, governments may 
be able to show that a prosecution is appropriately directed toward a 
public threat rather than motivated by partisanship. 
The judge in the Debs case permitted the defendant to make a 
speech defending his actions—opposition to American participation 
in World War I—on political grounds.102 The judge in the Dennis case 
prevented the defendants from arguing that the Communist Party had 
an appealing political program and limited them to the question 
whether the party had ever advocated violent revolution.103 Both 
trials were successes for the government and the judge; however, the 
Debs trial was less disruptive—even though Debs was a more 
politically popular figure. 
The problem with allowing defendants to mount a political 
defense is that they may persuade the public to take their side; even if 
they do not, they may be able to undermine the public’s confidence in 
the justice system by converting the trial into theater, preferably 
farce. Mockery of the judge, grandstanding, and delay become the 
defendant’s most powerful tools. Such disruptions may provoke the 
judge to take harsh measures against the defendants, further showing 
that the judge is complicit in the government’s effort to suppress 
political dissent. 
This strategy succeeded spectacularly in the trial of Elizabeth 
Dilling and her codefendants—a group of Nazi sympathizers 
prosecuted under the Smith Act during World War II—whose 
lawyers objected to every act of the prosecutor and disputed every 
ruling of the judge. The trial dragged on for months and then ended 
 
 102. PETERSON & FITE, supra  note 4, at 252–54. 
 103. STEINBERG, supra  note 4, at 223–24. 
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abruptly with the death of the trial judge—from exhaustion, it was 
said. A retrial, more than a year later, was dismissed.104 
To deal with these problems, judges need great skill and 
patience. The judges in the trial of Eugene Dennis and other 
members of the American Communist Party in 1949, and in the trial 
of the Chicago 8 in 1969, were considerably less tolerant of courtroom 
theatrics than the Dilling judge was. The Dennis judge frequently cut 
off the defendants and their lawyers. The Chicago 8 judge jailed 
defendants and their lawyers for contempt. In taking these steps, the 
judges opened themselves up to the accusation that they were 
depriving the defendants of a fair trial. Numerous rulings of the 
Chicago 8 judge were reversed on appeal. Although both judges 
survived the ordeal,105 the Dennis judge was more successful; the 
reason was almost surely that Dennis was, at the time of the trial, a 
less sympathetic figure than were the Chicago 8. In 1949, America 
was unified in its opposition to the Soviet Union, and therefore 
Dennis was unpopular except among fringe groups. In 1969, by 
contrast, America was divided over Vietnam, and the Chicago 8, 
although politically extreme, enjoyed some mainstream support for 
their stand against American militarism. 
Judges can interrupt defendants who do not follow the rules and 
hold defenses out of order. But defendants can complain about these 
rulings, and so jurors and other witnesses might conclude that the 
government’s motives are partisan, that the judge is complicit, and 
that the defendants are political opponents rather than public threats. 
Thus, like the other devices I have discussed, limiting the defense can 
have ambiguous effects. It can increase the probability of convicting a 
public threat by depriving the defendant of a defense, but it can also 
cause the jury to acquit the defendant, or the public to withdraw 
support from the government, because they suspect that the 
defendant is merely a political opponent. 
C. The Judge 
Judges are supposed to be impartial: they enforce the rules 
without bias toward the prosecution or the defense. For ordinary 
criminal trials, the ideal of the impartial judge is attainable because 
 
 104. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 40. 
 105. For the Dennis trial, see BELKNAP, supra  note 4, at 77–116, and STEINBERG, supra  note 
4, at 157–77; for the Chicago 8 trial, see David J. Danelski, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, in 
BECKER, supra note 98, at 178–80. 
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judges, whatever their hostility toward criminals, can enforce the 
rules of due process and ensure that people likely to have committed 
crimes are locked up in jail. These ordinary rules of process function 
mainly to ensure that innocent people are not inadvertently 
convicted. 
Normal process no longer functions smoothly when the 
defendant is a public threat who has not committed any crime. If no 
law against political dissent or opposition exists, then the judge can 
ensure conviction of the public threat only by relaxing the rule of law. 
In this way, the judge must be complicit in the government’s effort to 
selectively apply vague, general laws against particular defendants, or 
even in the trumping up of charges when no such laws can be used. 
This leads to a familiar dilemma. If judges relax process when 
they think that a defendant is a public threat, governments may take 
advantage of this opportunity and bring charges against partisan 
opponents. Eventually, the public, including the mainstream 
opposition, will realize that process protections have been relaxed, 
and the government will lose its credibility. If people believe that the 
government targets its political opponents by persuading judges that 
they are public threats, they will—on the theory I have advanced—
withdraw their support from the government. They would likely 
withdraw their trust from the judiciary as well. 
Several design features of the judiciary mitigate this tension. I 
divide them into two categories: selection of judges and incentives of 
judges. I then discuss how judges relax process. 
Selection of judges. In the United States, virtually every judge is a 
member of one of the two major political parties and is selected on 
the basis of two criteria: competence and proved partisan loyalty. In 
most other advanced countries, judges are members of the 
government bureaucracy but are trained and treated as experts, 
rather than partisans. 
The American system functions properly as long as the parties 
alternate in power or government is occasionally divided, so that 
judicial appointments are, individually or in the aggregate, the 
product of compromise between the two parties.106 As most judges 
 
 106. Cf. Ramseyer, supra note 63, at 728–30; Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil 
Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 
63–64, 83–86 (2003) (arguing that roughly equally matched parties in a competitive party system 
will tolerate an independent judiciary so that they are protected from persecution when out of 
power). 
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are the product of the patronage system, they will refuse to allow the 
other party in power to convict members of their own party on 
trumped-up charges. To be sure, frequently a (say) Republican 
government will be able to bring a case before a Republican judge, 
but there is always the chance that the appellate panel will be 
dominated by Democrats, who will be sure to draw attention to 
partisan elements in the trial if there are any. By contrast, neither a 
Republican nor a Democratic judge will have much sympathy for a 
radical who seeks to destroy the constitutional system under which 
the judge exercises power. Thus, any judge is more likely to relax the 
rules of process in such cases. 
The selection system in foreign countries is not quite as effective. 
Judges are trained as technocrats, and therefore they are more likely 
than their American counterparts to apply process rules in a 
mechanical fashion, regardless of the political views of the 
defendant.107 This may explain why legislatures in some of these 
countries—especially Germany—are more likely to pass laws that 
prohibit extreme political dissent inconsistent with the constitutional 
underpinnings of the state. 
Incentives of judges. Civil law systems make up for the weak 
selection mechanism of judges with more powerful incentives to 
comply with government policy. Judges are bureaucrats, and although 
they have some civil service protections, they are vulnerable to 
sanctions meted out by the government. In Japan, for example, judges 
who displease the government may find themselves assigned to 
remote rural districts.108 To avoid such sanctions, judges may be 
willing to relax process rules when the defendant is a public threat. 
But why would such judges not also permit convictions of partisan 
opponents? The answer is likely that the judges fear that the 
mainstream opposition party of today will be the party in power 
tomorrow, armed with the power to exile the judge to remote districts 
or show their displeasure in other ways. The alternation of parties 
maintains an incentive that enables the prosecution of people whom 
both parties dislike—genuine public threats—but prevents the 
 
 107. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1994–95 
(2004). 
 108. See Ramseyer, supra note 63, at 727–28 (“[J]udges who decided politically se nsitive 
cases according to non-LDP political preferences incurred a substantial risk that the Secretariat 
would assign them to a series of low-status positions.”). 
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prosecution of people whom only one party dislikes—members of 
another mainstream party. 
By contrast, it is harder for the American government to punish 
judges who fail to relax process in trials of public threats. Federal 
judges have independence under the Constitution that, as a practical 
matter, makes punishment impossible. Still, the government can 
reward compliant judges by elevating  them. Indeed, the judges in the 
Rosenberg and Dennis cases were elevated to the court of appeals.109 
Judge Hand, who ruled against the government in an Espionage Act 
case during World War I, was subsequently denied elevation to the 
court of appeals that may have been his due.110 
As a practical matter, then, the American and foreign systems 
may have the same effect. They either select judges or give them 
incentives such that process rules are likely to be maintained for trials 
of mainstream partisan political opponents, but not for trials of public 
threats or of people with fringe views. Judges might expect to be 
rewarded when they conduct trials that convict those widely regarded 
as public threats—either with popular acclaim, elevation, or similar 
benefits. In the first week after the Dennis case concluded, the 
presiding judge received fifty thousand letters from grateful citizens, 
many urging him to run for office.111 And, of course, judges may share 
the public’s fear of public threats, and, for that reason, be willing to 
relax process rules to convict them. 
How judges relax process. How do judges relax process without 
destroying the rule of law as a device for maintaining political peace 
between mainstream groups? The primary answer has been that 
judges relax process mainly during wartime and other emergencies.112 
In doing so, they ensure that political competition will occur during 
normal times, at which time judges will enforce process protections. 
They also seem to relax process when the defendant is a political 
extremist. 
 
 109. Irving Kaufman, who presided over the Rosenberg case, and Harold Medina, who 
presided over the Dennis case, were both elevated to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Both 
judges were highly regarded before these cases, so it is quite possible that they would have been 
elevated anyway. 
 110. See STONE, supra note 4, at 169–70. His elevation was delayed several years. Other 
judges who acted similarly were attacked in the press and ostracized. Id. 
 111. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 113. 
 112. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
605, 644 (2003).  
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As noted above, judges learned from the Sedition Act 
prosecutions of President John Adams’ administration the dangers of 
trying mainstream political opponents. Since then, there have been no 
American political trials of mainstream political opponents. All 
subsequent political trials have targeted extremists—Communists, 
anarchists, Nazis, KKK members, members of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups. When the government prosecutes extremists, the public is not 
as likely to assume that the government is trying to obtain partisan 
advantage—these extremists are just too weak and unpopular to be a 
political threat to the mainstream parties, and they are feared because 
of their tendency toward violence—except, of course, when the 
prosecution takes advantage of public fears or misunderstandings for 
political gain (though this is no different from ordinary prosecutions 
for political gain). 
This is not to say that trials of extremists have been 
uncontroversial. The public’s political views fall along a spectrum, 
and trials against extremists alarm people who hold views between 
the extremes and the mainstream. But the point is that American 
judges have allowed these trials to proceed, and doing so has been 
politically possible and even advantageous. 
Indeed, some judges have enthusiastically facilitated political 
prosecutions. The Federalist judges in the Sedition Act cases 
instructed juries in such a way that shifted much of the burden of 
proof onto the defendants.113 Most judges in Espionage Act cases 
during World War I read the statute broadly, so that the government 
would not need to provide evidence that the defendant’s statement 
caused a direct harm such as obstruction of military recruitment.114 
The judge in the Haymarket case allowed the bailiff to stack the jury 
with middle-class, mostly native-born citizens hostile to the anarchist, 
working-class, foreign-born defendants, and he gave the prosecution 
much more latitude than the defense.115 The judge in the Chicago 8 
case jailed many of the defendants and their lawyers for contempt, 
errors that were reversed on appeal.116 The judge in the LeRoi Jones 
 
 113. See, e.g., SMITH, supra  note 4, at 325–27 (“[T]he presiding judge relieved the jury of 
even [the duty of deciding on intent] by flatly stating that bad intent had been proved.”). 
 114. PETERSON & FITE, supra  note 4, at 17. 
 115. See AVRICH, supra  note 10, at 263–67. 
 116. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 78. 
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case made clear, by his questioning and demeanor, that he believed 
that Jones was guilty.117 
An abiding concern for judges is that if they identify too closely 
with the government, they will lose their reputation for impartiality. If 
they are not considered impartial, they will both lose much of their 
public support and also the support of the government itself, which 
can benefit from judges who constrain it somewhat, rather than too 
much or too little. 
For this reason, judges encourage governments to create 
specialized courts that are not operated by regular (Article III) 
judges. Military courts and commissions are examples; these tribunals 
do not eschew process altogether but do reduce it.118 Military judges 
and lawyers are loyal to the military, but they are expected to act with 
some independence and can be trusted to keep secrets.119 Allowing 
the government to use the military does not protect partisan 
opponents, but it does preserve the integrity of the judiciary (except 
to the extent that permitting military trials undermines it), so that it 
can credibly reassert its impartiality as between the mainstream 
parties when the emergency ends. 
The main example is the Civil War, when military rule enabled 
authorities in the North to prosecute people who expressed political 
sympathy with the Confederacy. These trials sometimes led to 
significant political disturbances in the Union and President Lincoln, 
who was more politically sophisticated than the generals to whom he 
had to delegate military rule, was not happy with them.120 However, 
to avoid the obstructionist efforts of mainstream judges like Justice 
Taney,121 Lincoln had to rely on military rule and accept its attendant 
risks. 
Similar factors have been at work in the Bush administration’s 
creation of military commissions to try al Qaeda members and 
Taliban soldiers. The establishment of these commissions has 
 
 117. See Dolbeare & Grossman, supra note 98, at 232–34 (“At the end of the trial [the 
judge] charged the jury so as to leave no doubt of his belief that Jones was a liar and a 
scoundrel . . . .”). 
 118. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648–49 (2004).  
 119. For the Supreme Court’s views of the tra de-offs involved, see Johnson v. Eise ntrager, 
339 U.S. 763, 778–80 (1950), which upheld the conviction by military tribunal of nonresident 
enemy aliens. 
 120. See RANDALL, supra  note 10, at 179 & n.16. 
 121. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). See generally  Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  
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apparently not hurt the government politically122 because the 
American public appears to believe that emergency conditions justify 
a relaxation of due process.123 Moreover, at the present time, it is not 
plausible to think that these commissions are being used against 
mainstream partisan opponents. 
D. The Jury 
Scholars today usually think of juries as fact-gathering 
institutions. Because jurors bring diverse experiences and 
expectations to the trial, they can combine their perspectives, 
enabling them to sift evidence more effectively than even a highly 
experienced judge. The assumption that juries are necessary for 
accuracy has stimulated a large literature that investigates the extent 
to which jurors really do make correct decisions about guilt and 
innocence. Although this literature has not reached firm conclusions, 
evidence suggests that cognitive biases and social influences may 
cause jurors to make worse decisions than judges do.124 
This scholarly focus has obscured another function of juries, 
which is not so much to contribute to the accuracy of the fact-
gathering process as to present a barrier against government 
oppression with judicial complicity. The jury’s entrenchment in 
American jurisprudence is due to its pre-Revolution popularity, when 
jury nullification derailed prosecutions of revolutionaries and other 
critics of the British government. The judges, who owed their position 
to British authorities, took the side of the prosecution and were 
frustrated by the recalcitrant juries. This history implanted in the 
American mind the conviction that juries, not judges, are the bulwark 
against political prosecutions.125 
 
 122. Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry did not make an issue of them during the 
2004 presidential election campaign. 
 123. Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, July 26–27, 2005, in War on Terrorism, 
POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm (last viewed Oct. 1, 2005) 
(noting 65 percent of respondents favored “protecting [their] safety and surroundings from 
terrorism” over “protecting [their] civil liberties”); Pew Research Center for the People & the 
Press Survey, July 13–17, 2005, in War on Terrorism, supra (tracking the margin by which 
respondents’ concern that the government “[had] not gone far enough to adequately protect the 
country” outweighed their concern that it “[had] gone too far in restricting the average person’s 
civil liberties”). 
 124. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES : HOW JURIES DECIDE 79–95, 
245–48 (2003); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex-Post ? Ex Ante: Determining Liberty 
in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995). 
 125. See Amar, supra  note 4, at 1150–51. 
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The history suggests that the jury could be an ideal device for 
permitting political prosecutions against public threats but preventing 
those against partisan opponents. After the American Revolution, the 
jury could no longer regard the government as presumptively a 
hostile force. And if the government can make a plausible case that a 
particular defendant poses a public threat, the jury may be willing to 
convict even though the legal basis of the conviction is weak. In 
addition, as long as the jury is politically diverse—in the sense of 
having at least one or two members who belong to, or sympathize 
with, the opposition party—the unanimity rule ensures that partisan 
convictions will not be possible. To be sure, extremists who find their 
way onto juries may be able to block the conviction of a public threat, 
but judges and lawyers are careful to prevent such people from being 
assigned to the jury. Thus, as a general matter, juries ought to be able 
to hinder partisan prosecutions, but not prosecutions of public 
threats. 
American history provides only ambiguous evidence for this 
hypothesis. Juries’ propensity to return convictions does not appear 
to depend on whether the defendant belonged to an extremist or 
mainstream group. Thus, although it is true that Wobblies, members 
of the Communist Party, and foreign spies have been routinely 
convicted,126 juries also returned convictions almost without exception 
under the Sedition Act of 1798, which targeted mainstream 
opponents of the government.127 Juries did not interfere with Sedition 
Act prosecutions because jurors were selected by political appointees 
such as marshals,128 and many of the judges instructed the juries in an 
aggressive fashion.129 However, jury manipulation became a political 
issue that was exploited by the Republicans;130 the fear of jury 
nullification may explain why there were not more trials in the 
Republican-dominated South.131 
 
 126. But not always: trials of some prominent radicals during World War I under the 
Espionage Act resulted in a hung jury. See STONE, supra note 4, at 170 & n.*. Some Vietnam-
era trials also ended in acquittals or hung juries. Id. at 483. 
 127. See SMITH, supra  note 4 passim. For one exception, see id. at 282. 
 128. Id. at 423; see, e.g., id. at 235–36, 321, 348 (identifying the role that political divisions 
played in the trials of Lyon, Cooper, and Callendar). 
 129. See id. at 325–27. 
 130. See id. at 321, 348. 
 131. Id. at 187. The preponderance of trials in northern and middle states was due to the 
greater influence of Federalists in those areas. Id. at 177. 
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The best evidence for the hypothesis that juries could block 
political convictions comes from the Civil War. With the suspension 
of habeas corpus and military rule, political opponents could be tried 
without a jury or, for that matter, without an independent judge. It 
seems clear that the reason that Lincoln and then Congress 
suspended habeas corpus was that they expected juries to acquit 
Southern sympathizers and others who were conspiring to impede 
troop movements or engage in sabotage but who had not committed a 
provable crime.132 
The costs and visibility of manipulating juries to ensure 
conviction may prove too high for many governments. The more 
mainstream the political opponent, the more difficult it is to 
manipulate the jury—because it is more likely that a member of the 
opponent’s party will end up on the jury unless manipulation takes 
place. And even if manipulation is successful, it may be blatant and 
thus good fodder for the defense. The right to a jury may in fact have 
resulted in fewer partisan trials than otherwise would have occurred.  
E. The Defense Lawyer 
Good legal process grants criminal defendants the right to 
competent and independent defense counsel. Competence is a 
straightforward requirement; independence is more complex. 
Defense lawyers are officers of the court, and they are not permitted 
to help the defendant engage in perjury. But, even if paid by the 
government, they are, as a matter of custom, law, and professional 
self-understanding, antagonistic to the prosecution, to the point that 
obtaining an acquittal of a guilty client may seem a positive duty and 
a badge of honor. And, of course, defense lawyers attract clients by 
obtaining acquittals. 
When the defendant is a public threat, the independence of the 
defense counsel may create problems. At one extreme, defense 
lawyers may belong to groups that share the goals of the defendant. If 
so, revealing classified information to defense lawyers becomes an 
unacceptable risk for the government. Even allowing defense lawyers 
to have private contact with defendants may pose unacceptable risks 
because defense lawyers may carry messages between defendants and 
 
 132. See Farber, supra note 8, at 16–18; Frank L. Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials 
and Ex Parte Milligan, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, supra note 10, at 97, 101–03. 
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their organizations.133 Even a defense lawyer who does not share the 
defendant’s goals may inadvertently reveal sensitive information. 
At the other extreme, the defense lawyer’s good-faith zeal on 
behalf of a client may hinder the prosecution of a public threat. 
Defense lawyers demand process; if the government relaxes process, 
the defense lawyer will draw attention to the government’s efforts, 
causing public embarrassment, and perhaps will persuade the jury to 
acquit. All of this may be tolerable, but it is far from ideal. 
Denying the defendant a lawyer is hardly a solution, as it 
encourages the public to think that the defendant is being tried for 
partisan reasons. 
Various intermediate mechanisms have been developed. First, 
the weakest constraint is to require defense lawyers to abjure any 
connection with, or sympathy for, extremist groups. In the United 
States, this constraint arose in a decentralized way when bar 
associations decided that their members could not belong to the 
Communist Party.134 
Second, governments may replace civilian defense lawyers with 
military lawyers. This requires either a suspension of habeas corpus, 
as in the Civil War, or else classifying the defendant as an enemy 
combatant.135 Military procedure does not usually dispense with 
lawyers, but these lawyers are soldiers and therefore can be assumed 
to be more loyal to the state than ordinary defense lawyers. 
Third, governments can give more or less assistance to lawyers; 
more or less access to their clients; and so forth. In some of the enemy 
combatant cases arising from the prosecution of the war on terror, the 
defendants were initially denied access to a lawyer, and then given 
limited access under supervision.136 
To the extent that defense lawyers feel loyalty to the 
government, or have internalized norms of judicial process—such that 
they will attack the prosecutor but not the system—they may have 
limited value for the political defendant. The American Communist 
 
 133. See Julia Preston, Lawyer Is Guilty of Aiding Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1 
(describing the conviction for providing material aid to a terrorist of a lawyer who represented 
an al Qaeda member). 
 134. See KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 19, at 253–54 (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 
252 (1957)); see also Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1951). 
 135. It remains unclear whether defendants must be given civilian lawyers. See generally 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
 136. Neil A. Lewis, Sudden Shift on Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A1. 
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Party instructed its members not to use lawyers, or to limit them to 
the technical aspects of the case, and trained its members to use the 
courtroom as a platform for espousing their opposition to capitalism. 
The goal was not to persuade the jury to acquit the defendants—
though that would be welcome—but to persuade workers that the 
capitalist justice system could not do justice.137 
F. Publicity 
Political trials are often, but not always, public. Publicity serves 
the cause of the government when it believes that the defendant is a 
public threat and that the public, persuaded by the prosecution that 
the defendant is dangerous, will forgive any bending of the rule of law 
and feel gratitude to the government for protecting it. 
But publicity also protects the defendant, who can use the trial as 
a platform to denounce the government. The Chicago 8 trial is the 
best example of this phenomenon in recent memory,138 but there have 
been many other trials in which the government dropped or settled 
charges after the political danger of the trial became clear, or 
pardoned or granted clemency to the defendants. Eugene Debs’s 
stature rose after his conviction for sedition during World War I. He 
received almost one million votes for president while in jail, and 
subsequently his sentence was commuted by President Warren 
Harding.139 
If publicity can protect the political opponent, it can also 
endanger the prosecution of the public threat. Many political trials 
have prosecuted accused spies, such as Ethel and Julius Rosenberg 
and Alger Hiss, and in conducting such trials, the government does 
not want to reveal secret information to the world. The usual practice 
is to keep relatively low-level trials secret when doing so is permitted 
by law; proceedings of military tribunals may be kept secret, for 
example. But, this creates the risk that the public will infer that the 
defendants are not public threats but political rivals of the 
government. 
 
 137. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 13–15 (discussing the activities of the International Labor 
Defense).  
 138. See Danelski, supra  note 105, at 164. 
 139. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 97–98. Harding also commuted the 
sentences of Abrams and his codefendants, but this was part of a bargain in return for which the 
defendants exiled themselves from the United States. RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING 
FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 336–38 (1987). 
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Political trials are often farcical, and, for many, this shows that 
they are a bad idea. At the Chicago 8 trial, two of the defendants, 
Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, appeared in court one day wearing 
judicial robes, and then took them off and wiped their feet on them.140 
At the Dilling trial, defense lawyers repetitiously lodged identical 
objections on behalf of each of the defendants to delay the trial and 
frustrate the judge.141 But the elements of farce are the result of the 
specific strategy of the defendant to risk everything to make the 
government back down, rather than working within the legal process 
in the hope of gaining a regular acquittal or reduced sentence. In 
some cases, like the Chicago 8 trial, the farce worked in favor of the 
defendants, who managed to convince large segments of the public 
that the justice system or the government was unjust.142 But, in other 
cases, like the Dennis case, the farce left the public unmoved, the 
strategy failed, and the movement petered out.143 As messy as these 
trials were, it is far from clear that they were failures, from the 
perspective of the government. 
G. Summary 
In political trials, the government and the defendant battle for 
public opinion. The government seeks to persuade the public that the 
defendant is a public threat rather than a mere political opponent. If 
this is true, the government’s best strategy is to publicize the trial and 
give the defendant ample time to make a political defense (for 
example, “Justice is not possible without a proletarian/Islamic 
revolution.”) Any defects in process may be forgiven by the judge, 
jury, and public, who are glad to see the threat extinguished. 
Sophisticated defendants in cases like these, however, will 
downplay their revolutionary ardor and draw attention to the defects 
in process. If, for example, the government relies on a general law, 
the defendant will point out that the government could use the law 
against mainstream political opponents as well as radicals or 
extremists. If the judge or some jurors belong to the out-of-power 
party, they may be persuaded to acquit to protect themselves and 
their party. Moderates in the public may become suspicious that the 
 
 140. Danelski, supra  note 105, at 164. 
 141. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 40. 
 142. Danelski, supra  note 105, at 177–80. 
 143. BELKNAP, supra note 4, at 168. 
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government is establishing a precedent with the extremists before 
turning its attention to mainstream political opponents. If so, they 
may put political pressure on the government to drop the charges. 
The government, then, has the task of persuading the judge, jury, 
and public that the relaxation of process (or the enforcement of 
explicit laws against political dissent) is limited to cases involving 
authentic public threats. This can be done by limiting the law or 
enforcement action to aliens, people with connections to enemy 
foreign countries or movements, people with connections to groups 
that engage in violence, and people with highly sensitive positions 
(soldiers, spies, government employees), and by granting as much 
process as is compatible with the requirements of secrecy. As I have 
argued, allowing political defenses may also be useful. 
Complicating matters for the government, the logistical 
difficulties of running an ordinary criminal trial become political 
problems in a political trial. The everyday compromises of a normal 
criminal trial—the judge and prosecutor’s influence over the 
composition of the jury; reliance on secret evidence or testimony 
when victims or informers face retaliation; the need to cut off 
defendants, witnesses, and lawyers in the interest of time; the 
exclusion of morally relevant but legally irrelevant arguments; the 
blunders of subpar lawyers and judges—take on heightened 
significance at a political trial, in which a skeptical public may 
misinterpret these normal compromises as a special effort by the 
government to deprive the defendant of what the public thinks are 
the standard protections. When the public is suspicious enough about 
the government’s motives, the government might be well advised to 
give the defendant heightened process and focus on convicting the 
defendant for violations of normal laws (if any) rather than making 
vague “dangerousness” the focus of the trial. 
The amount of process granted in a trial is a function of all the 
factors that I have discussed—the independence of the judge, the 
availability of defense lawyers, the extent of the right to make a case 
and cross-examine, and so forth. It is not clear whether each element 
is essential or whether granting more of one element can compensate 
for less of another; this is perhaps true in some cases but not others. 
Each factor is context specific. It may be necessary to deny an 
articulate and charismatic defendant the amount of time available for 
testimony that is given to a regular defendant. Publicity and even 
lawyers may have to be dispensed with when the evidence consists of 
secret materials; in this case, a judge from an out-of-power party may 
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nonetheless serve to constrain the government appropriately. Again, 
an independent judiciary may be unavailable when it is tainted—a 
common problem for trials in transitional regimes—and a dependent 
judge will be used; but then other protections (defense lawyers, for 
example) may compensate for the subservient judge. 
IV.  VARIATIONS ON THE POLITICAL TRIAL 
This Part examines trials that are variations on the type of 
political trial that I have discussed so far. Trials of enemy combatants 
are an even purer form of the politically colored domestic criminal 
trial: their main purpose is identifying people who are threats but who 
have not committed crimes. Transitional trials are efforts to eliminate 
the influence of politically dangerous people left over from an earlier 
regime. Pedagogical trials are trials whose purpose is to educate the 
public. And international trials are politically colored because 
international law is very weak and, in its practical application, is 
heavily influenced by the geopolitical agendas of powerful states. 
A. Trials of Enemy Combatants 
Nations have traditionally detained captured soldiers for the 
duration of hostilities and tried and punished those enemy soldiers 
who committed war crimes. These trials have elements of both 
political trials and ordinary trials. On the one hand, enemy soldiers 
tried for war crimes are usually granted the same process that one’s 
own soldiers are granted, and the laws of war are generally accepted 
by nations.144 On the other hand, prosecutions of soldiers reflect 
military and political goals. Immunity is granted to enemy soldiers 
with intelligence value, technical expertise, managerial skills, and 
other characteristics that are important to some new war effort or to 
the return to peace. For example, the U.S. granted immunity to 
Japanese researchers who had conducted experiments on prisoners of 
war (POWs), a price deemed worth paying for the information they 
had to offer.145 Moreover, the armies rarely prosecuted their own 
soldiers for war crimes. 
 
 144. These principles are required by the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War pt. I, art. III, § 1(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 145. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 465 
(1999). 
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The laws of war extend their protection only to soldiers who 
meet certain qualifications. They must wear uniforms, carry their 
weapons openly, belong to a regularly  constituted military unit, and 
meet related criteria.146 Soldiers who violate these rules are 
considered spies, guerillas, or, in the current phrase, “unlawful 
combatants,” and deprived of the rights enjoyed by POWs. Shortly 
after its entry into World War II, the American military set up a 
military commission to try German soldiers—including one American 
citizen—who had sneaked onto American territory to engage in 
sabotage.147 This type of military commission need not comply with 
the requirements of the Geneva Convention—for example, it may 
grant less process than the tribunals used for POWs who commit 
crimes. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has 
claimed the right to classify Americans and foreigners as unlawful 
combatants and to detain them until the end of hostilities.148 The 
government also has established military commissions that have the 
authority to try enemy combatants—members of al Qaeda and 
affiliates—for war crimes.149 
The U.S. government’s post-9/11 legal strategy has received a 
great deal of criticism. Many critics argue that al Qaeda terrorists 
should be treated as criminal suspects and, when captured, given the 
same process as regular criminal defendants.150 Although the courts 
have not gone this far, they have demanded that the government 
grant unlawful combatants more process than the government was 
initially willing to give them.151 The debate, within the courts and 
outside them, has weighed the unfairness of denying process against 
the demands of military exigency.152 
 
 146. See Hague Convention (II) on Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Geneva Convention (III), supra note 144, at pt. I, art. IV, 75 
U.N.S.T. 138. 
 147. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942). 
 148. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715–17 (2004).  
 149. It is not yet clear whether this plan will be acceptable to courts; for an argument that 
the commissions are constitutional, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The 
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002). See also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640–42 (2004). 
 150. E.g., Peter Spiro, Not War, Crimes, FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY, Sept. 19, 2001, 
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20010919_spiro.html. 
 151. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648; Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004). 
 152. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra  note 69, at 181–87; David Luban, The War on 
Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 4, at 
219, 221–23. 
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The theory that I have advanced sheds light on this debate, albeit 
from a different angle. One question—why the post-9/11 strategy 
reflects a military rather than law enforcement approach, when 
similar actions during earlier wars were undertaken mainly by law 
enforcement—can be easily answered. 
First, the public believes that the threat posed by al Qaeda is 
enormous; for that reason, it will tolerate a reduction of political 
competition to enable the government to counter the threat. By 
contrast, the public has had more mixed views about the threats 
posed by domestic Communists, anarchists, and members of other 
fringe movements. World War I and the Vietnam War had less public 
support than the war on terror because America’s enemies did not 
pose as palpable a threat. 
Second, members of al Qaeda are, for the most part, ethnically 
and religiously distinct from Americans. As long as the government 
focuses its investigative efforts on Arabs, Muslims, and aliens from 
Arab and Muslim countries, and the American public believes that 
the government’s attention is confined to these types of people, the 
vast majority of the public itself will feel unthreatened by politically 
motivated prosecutions. By contrast, World War I–era prosecutions 
often targeted ordinary Americans, especially those affiliated with the 
labor movement, which enjoyed widespread support. 
In these two ways, the closest precedent for the effort against al 
Qaeda is the internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II. Both cases involve high and palpable risks to American civilians 
on American territory; and both cases involve an unassimilated, 
ethnically distinct, and politically weak group, which could be 
targeted for special measures without creating the risk that such 
measures would be used against mainstream Americans.153 
Third, the war against terror is a bipartisan effort. The 
government cannot credibly accuse the opposition party—the 
Democrats—of being supporters of al Qaeda, so the government 
cannot plausibly classify Democrats as enemy combatants. The 
current situation bears no resemblance to the Sedition Act 
prosecutions, which were brought by Federalists who believed that 
 
 153. However, the use of military commissions has received more criticism after September 
11 than during World War II. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and 
Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 274, 280–89 
(2002) (arguing that the difference in reactions is due to greater suspicion of government, 
greater respect for civil rights, and the lesser magnitude of the threat).  
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the Republicans had allied themselves with France, then America’s 
enemy in an undeclared war.154 Nor does it resemble the Cold War, 
when Republicans could castigate the Democrats for being soft on 
Communism but never tried to bring criminal charges against 
mainstream Democratic opponents. 
All of this suggests that reduced process protections during the 
war against terror do not provide the Bush administration with real 
opportunities for targeting political opponents; thus, few people 
regard the trials and detentions as motivated by partisan political 
objectives. To be sure, these trials and detentions may be mistaken, 
unfair, opportunistic, and political in the sense of being designed to 
show the public that the government is doing something when it 
really is not doing much. But this does not distinguish them from 
ordinary law enforcement practices. As long as al Qaeda and similar 
groups pose a genuine public threat, and as long as these groups are 
unable to acquire significant support from mainstream Americans, 
the reduction in process protections tolerated by the courts so far can 
be explained using the instrumental theory of liberal legalism. 
B. Transitional Trials 
Transitional trials occur when a newly democratic state tries 
officials of the old regime for acts that were lawful at the time they 
were performed. The transitional government faces a delicate 
problem. It must, on the one hand, satisfy demands for substantive 
justice against the old regime and eliminate the influence of remnants 
that continue to hold important positions in the military, bureaucracy, 
and economy. On the other hand, the transitional government must 
avoid the accusation that it is using transitional trials to do what the 
old regime did: eliminate political opponents through a perversion of 
the judicial process. Transitional governments have balanced these 
considerations in several ways. 
First, the government may rely on the exceptional nature of the 
transition and the crimes of the members of the old regime. Their 
chief crime (in a moral sense) was the rejection of liberal legality; 
they are being punished, in part, for that offense. The public watching 
the trial need not infer that ordinary individuals will be similarly 
denied due process once the transition has been completed and the 
regime has entered the phase of normal politics. Retroactivity, in a 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65. 
02_POSNER.DOC  2/6/2006   4:01  PM 
134 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:75 
paradoxical way, reduces concerns of political motivation by 
indicating that younger people untainted by the past have nothing to 
fear from the courts. 
Second, the government may grant the defendant as much 
process as is compatible with the retroactive nature of the trial. This is 
not trivial and may include the assignment of a lawyer, the chance to 
testify and cross-examine, publicity, and so forth. A government bent 
on eliminating its political opponents would not give defendants these 
rights.155 The lesson is that the government may, and should, exercise 
restraint when pursuing its political opponents. This may seem like a 
modest lesson, but it is an important one for states emerging from 
decades of totalitarianism. 
Third, governments may rely heavily on legal fictions to conceal 
the political motivation of the prosecutions. I will say more about this 
tactic in Section C. 
Finally, some governments may use administrative proceedings 
rather than trials. In Czechoslovakia, for example, administrative 
proceedings were used to identify and “lustrate” former officials and 
collaborators, who were deprived of positions in the government but 
could otherwise resume a normal life.156 These proceedings reduced 
both process and punishment. The government thus could not take 
advantage of the limited process in these proceedings to eliminate its 
political opponents but could only embarrass them; the 
embarrassment was, in any case, connected to the source of the 
transitional government’s legitimacy—the decisive public rejection of 
the old regime. 
C. Pedagogical Trials 
Much discussion of political trials concerns a second-order issue: 
the educational message that they send to the public. Uncomfortable 
with the notion that a trial could ever be justified by public demands 
for retributive justice or the dangers posed by a public threat, scholars 
have instead focused on how political trials may teach the public 
liberal values. Four examples will illustrate this argument. 
First, Professor Jon Elster and other scholars argue that 
transitional trials may be justified as a way to educate the public 
 
 155. For instance, Stalin’s regime did not do so. See CONQUEST, supra note 73, at 92 
(discussing trials during Stalin’s rule in which sentences were set before the trials even began).  
 156. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 767. 
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about the rule of law.157 Observers of the transitions feared that 
liberal democracy would not take hold in societies in which the rule of 
law had been repudiated for decades. By conducting fair trials of 
members of the old regime, transitional trials would dramatically 
show that the rule of law extends even to enemies of the new 
government. 
Second, Professor Shklar argues that the Nuremberg trial was 
justified as a device for creating new norms of international 
illegality.158 Prior to that trial, international law did not prohibit 
genocide and other crimes against humanity; the trial helped 
established that this behavior was criminal.159 In doing so, the 
Nuremberg trial helped extend international law beyond its 
traditional application to states and into the realm of human rights. 
Third, several scholars have pointed out that the Nuremberg trial 
placed “on the record” thousands of archival documents that showed 
how the Nazis engineered the Holocaust.160 Truth is a liberal virtue, 
and documenting atrocities is thus a liberal duty. This argument was 
used by those who supported the establishment of the tribunals 
charged with trying perpetrators of international crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.161 
Fourth, many domestic political trials have been intended to 
teach the public about emerging threats. The trials of Jeffersonian 
Republicans were intended to show that the defendants were in 
league with America’s enemy, France.162 The trials of Nazi 
sympathizers and Communists were intended to show Americans that 
 
 157. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra  note 37, at 29; Jon Elster, Moral Dilemmas of Transitional 
Justice, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Peter Baumann & Monika 
Betzler eds., 2002). Professor Walzer makes an analogous argument about the executions of 
Charles I and Louis XVI. He claims that democracy could not be established until the 
subservient habits that evolved in a monarchy were eliminated; to him, the symbolism of the 
trials was of great significance. See WALZER, supra note 10, at 86–89. 
 158. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 170–79. 
 159. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 31–47 (2002). 
 160. See, e.g., LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND 
HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2001) (arguing that these trials can successfully 
reconcile the demands of legal process and of history). 
 161. This is emphasized by OSIEL, supra  note 37, at 53–55, who argues that political trials in 
transitional settings are important for shaping the collective memory of past atrocities.  
 162. SMITH, supra  note 4, at 14. 
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the Nazis, then the Communists, posed a threat to American 
security.163 
The educational purpose of political trials is different from, but 
not necessarily inconsistent with, their main purpose, which is to 
counter public threats or to do substantive justice. However, in 
practice, the main purpose of the trials takes precedence and obscures 
their educational impact. As several critics have noted, the 
transitional trials might be interpreted not as a vindication or even 
illustration of the rule of law, but as the opposite: as demonstrations 
that judicial process and the rule of law can be disregarded when the 
defendants are political opponents.164 After all, these trials resulted in 
the conviction of people for activities that did not violate any law at 
the time that they occurred. This apparent dilemma has also bothered 
critics of international war crimes trials, who fear that the educational 
purposes of these trials may corrupt the judicial process.165 
The criticism is too simple, but it does have an element of truth. 
Transitional trials are meant to show, in part, that the old regimes’ 
great sin was their disregard of liberal legalism; not to punish 
members of the old regime would also send the wrong message, as it 
would indicate that tyrants are not punished for their tyranny. The 
lesson of the transitional trials is that, if political opposition may be 
tolerable within the constraints of a liberal constitutional order, the 
rejection of liberal democracy is never tolerable. 
This message has not, however, been delivered in the most 
candid way. Rather than forthrightly announcing that certain political 
beliefs and systems would not be tolerated, the governments have 
surrounded the judicial proceedings with legal fictions. The fictions 
implied that the defendants were being tried and punished for 
committing crimes recognized as such during the old regime. 
In the trials of East German border guards, for example, many 
jurists claimed, and some judges held, that the conviction could be 
based on prior law—including international treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
 
 163. See POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 204–28 (discussing the 
blacklisting of the Hollywood 10 for their refusals to cooperate with the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities); id. at 271–74  (describing  an indictment charging that individuals 
joined “the Nazi movement to destroy democracy throughout the world” ). 
 164. See the discussion and citations in Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 762–65. 
 165. See ARENDT, supra note 4, at 135 (“He did his duty . . . he not only obeyed orders, he 
also obeyed the law.”). 
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international jus cogens norms against human rights violations, West 
German law (on the theory that East German law was never valid 
because East Germany never had sovereignty), natural law, and East 
German law that on its face could be interpreted as prohibiting the 
border killings.166 These were all subterfuges: the ICCPR and jus 
cogens norms were never thought to apply to domestic prosecutions 
like the border guard cases, and East German law, whose 
preunification domestic validity was acknowledged by West Germany 
in the unification treaty, authorized the border guards to kill people 
who were trying to escape.167 Academics who recognize the force of 
retroactive justice in the transitional setting nonetheless find the lack 
of candor intolerable. Let the governments prosecute the remnants of 
the old regime for the misery it inflicted, says Professor Elster, but 
make them admit what they are doing.168 Hannah Arendt anticipated 
this reaction with nearly identical comments about the Eichmann 
trial: don’t pretend that Eichmann broke the law; admit that the 
motivation for the trial was revenge.169 
These criticisms reflect the worry that the trials will not educate 
people if they send muddy or mixed messages. But one can see why it 
is unwise to use political trials for educational purposes by asking why 
the German government and courts did not follow Elster’s 
recommendation. Surely, the government’s main concern was 
obtaining convictions—both to appease longstanding outrage in West 
Germany at the actions of the border guards and to show East 
Germans that such behavior would no longer be tolerated. The judges 
appeared to have seen the force of these goals, but their jobs were to 
enforce the law, not implement official policy. It is hard to imagine 
them candidly announcing that they would imprison the border 
guards even though they broke no laws. The educational goal of the 
trials ran up against the bureaucratic realities of a modern liberal 
state. 
The same problem exists for the goal of creating a historical 
record. One purpose of the Nuremberg trial was to provide a record 
 
 166. Posner & Vermeule, supra  note 37, at 793–95; see Kif Augustine Adams, What Is Just?: 
The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German Border Guards, 29 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 271, 295–300 (1993). 
 167. A. JAMES MCADAMS, JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED GERMANY 31–34 (2001). 
 168. See Elster, supra note 157, at 308–09; Hart, supra note 37, at 619–20. 
 169. See ARENDT, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“What we have demanded in these trials, where 
the [defendant] ha[s] committed ‘legal’ crimes, is that human beings be capable of telling right 
from wrong.”). 
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of the Holocaust.170 The extensive German documentation of the 
concentration and death camps could be entered into the record of 
the tria l; films of the atroc ities were also shown.171 The French 
referred to their trial of Klaus Barbie as a “pedagogical trial” because 
its purpose was to teach the public about French complicity in the 
Holocaust.172 
But as the Nuremberg trial shows, the efforts to provide a record 
of history conflicted time and again with the more important goal of 
proving the charges. The Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutors sought 
representatives of important segments of the population to stand as 
defendants. The German and Japanese publics needed to learn that 
the rot had spread throughout the military, the bureaucracy, and the 
industrial elite. A trial of four army generals would not have been as 
effective as a trial of one general, one admiral, one diplomat, and one 
industrialist. At Nuremberg, Justice Jackson sought to implicate 
German industry; but, when a natural choice—Adolf Krupps—turned 
out to be too ill to stand trial, Justice Jackson’s demand that his son 
Gustav be substituted outraged the judges, and they refused.173 In 
Japan, the prosecutors made sure to charge not only representatives 
of each component of the Japanese government, but also to find 
defendants to represent each time period—the attack on Manchuria 
as well as the attack on Pearl Harbor—although government officials 
during the various periods were not the same.174 These choices all 
contributed to a satisfying narrative arc, but they also made the 
government vulnerable to the argument that the trial was intended 
for propaganda, not to establish the truth. 
Nuremberg illustrates other compromises. Because the trial had 
to be conducted with dispatch, many atrocities were not discussed: the 
records had not yet been discovered.175 Because the prosecutors relied 
on documentation rather than witnesses, undocumented but amply 
witnessed events were also downplayed. Most important, each victor 
state had different preferences about which events to emphasize and 
 
 170. Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 179 
(1947). 
 171. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 101. 
 172. DOUGLAS, supra  note 160, at 185–86. 
 173. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 138–39. 
 174. Solis Horwitz, The Tokyo Trial, 28 INT’L CONCILIATION 473, 495–97 (1950).  
 175. CONOT, supra  note 1, at 87–88 (1983); see also MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE 
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945–46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 193 (1997). 
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which to suppress.176 For the Russians, the goal was to show the world 
the extent of the sacrifice of the Russian people, and to conceal 
Russian atrocities and Russian aggression against Poland and other 
innocent states. This was not the aim of the Americans, who 
preferred to emphasize the guilt of German leaders for waging 
aggressive war. A similar problem arose over the charge that the 
German invasion of Norway was part of its conspiracy to engage in 
aggressive war; the Nazis responded that they had merely preempted 
a British and French invasion of Norway—which was true, and 
embarrassing to the British, who refused to release secret documents 
that would have confirmed the defendants’ claim.177 Events that 
placed the victors in a bad light were suppressed as much as possible. 
Indeed, even though everyone suspected the Russians, the indictment 
charged that the Germans had massacred the Polish officers at Katyn 
Forest.178 As is always the case in trials, the establishment of the truth, 
in all its nuance and complexity, was subordinated to the immediate 
goals of proving or refuting the charges.179 
Even when the truth comes out, it does not necessarily follow 
that the right lessons will be learned. The Allies initially hoped that 
the Nuremberg trial would teach the Germans and their own 
populations that the German leaders were evil and that there was no 
possible justification for their behavior. The dual goals were the 
education of the Germans about their own leadership, so that they 
could reconcile themselves to a new order in which Germany would 
either be ruled by foreign powers or else have greatly reduced 
international status, and vindication of the political leadership of the 
Allied countries.180 
Throughout the trial, the prosecutors and judges feared that the 
defendants would argue that (1) the war crimes committed by the 
 
 176. See, e.g., TUSA & TUSA, supra  note 1, at 104–07. 
 177. MARRUS, supra note 175, at 138–39. 
 178. Id. at 56–57. The Soviets subsequently presented witnesses testifying as to German 
responsibility for the massacre, but when they tried to prevent the Germans from providing 
their own witnesses, their motion was refused by the tribunal. Id. at 100–01. 
 179. For another example taken from the Klaus Barbie trial, see DOUGLAS, supra note 160, 
at 189, who discusses the way that the requirements of legal form caused prosecutors to 
downplay the most serious aspects of Barbie’s crimes. Osiel provides further examples from the 
Barbie, Nuremberg, Eichmann, and Argentine junta trials. See generally OSIEL, supra note 37, 
at 79–141. 
 180. MINEAR, supra note 10, at 13–14 (discussing Justice Jackson’s statements at the 
London Conference where the Nuremberg  charter was drafted). 
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Nazis were matched by war crimes committed by the Allies; and (2) 
Germany’s behavior was justified by the Versailles Treaty and was 
abetted during the 1930s by the British and the French, who ratified 
many of the formal violations of the Versailles Treaty by the 
Germans, and by Russia, which cooperated with Germany in many 
ways.181 Although not many citizens of Allied nations would have 
been receptive to these arguments, German citizens might have been; 
thus, the trial, like the Versailles Treaty itself, could have become a 
rallying point for unreconstructed Nazis and nationalists in Germany. 
Although the defendants did make these arguments, they did not 
have the expected effect. The Germans at first ignored the trial, 
regarding it as irrelevant or as an exercise in Allied propaganda. But 
then something surprising happened: the  German people began to 
feel that they were themselves on trial. The trial made clear the vast 
participation of ordinary citizens in the Nazi extermination machine, 
even though “[t]hat had never been Jackson’s intention. He, like 
many others, had hoped to prune out Nazism and induce healthy 
growth in remaining Germany. The idea of German guilt had not 
appeared in the indictment. It had emerged during the trial.”182 
But a guilty nation was not a nation that could rejoin the world 
community as a liberal democracy. If there was something wrong with 
Germans, how could they be given political responsibility? The 
notion of German guilt grew particularly difficult for the Americans 
as it became clear, partway through the trial and to the premature 
delight of the defendants, that the Germans would be America’s allies 
in the gathering Cold War against the Soviet Union.183 Polling data 
suggest that the Germans initially thought that the trial was fair, but 
changed their minds after a few years; by the 1950s, the dominant 
view was that the trials were unfair and the convictions were victor’s 
justice.184 
 
 181. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 1, at 260, 304. 
 182. Id. at 223. 
 183. Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, was the turning point. See id. at 
201. 
 184. PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY: THE OMGUS SURVEYS, 1945–1949, at 93, 
121, 138 (Anna J. Merritt & Richard L. Merritt eds., 1970); PUBLIC OPINION IN 
SEMISOVEREIGN GERMANY: THE HICOG SURVEYS, 1949–1955, at 101 (Anna J. Merritt & 
Richard L. Merritt eds., 1980); see also RICHARD L. MERRITT, DEMOCRACY IMPOSED: U.S. 
OCCUPATION POLICY AND THE GERMAN PUBLIC, 1945–49, at 160–73 (1995). The trials did not 
have measurable impact on American public opinion. See WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON 
NUREMBERG: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-CRIME TRIALS 
87–116 (1970). 
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The Tokyo war crimes tribunal had the opposite but equally 
unwelcome effect. The Japanese did not consider themselves on trial, 
or guilty, though they were horrified when they learned about the 
atrocities committed by their soldiers. But as bad as their soldiers 
were, they did not seem any worse than the Americans, who had 
killed hundreds of thousands of civilians through firebombing and 
atomic bombing. The trial gave the defendants an opportunity to 
defend Japan’s militarism, an opportunity seized by Marshal Tojo 
with great success.185 Tojo argued that Japan had acted in self-defense 
against colonial aggression. “Only victor nations sat on the Bench, 
many of them colonial powers with far longer records of imperia lism 
than Japan—and they allowed the colonies they were intent on 
regaining no place among the judges.”186 The trial suggested the 
moral equivalence of the victors and vanquished with respect to 
aggression, but the victors had a monopoly on hypocrisy. 
A great problem for the Tokyo trials was the decision by the 
U.S., made prior to the initiation of the trial, to allow the Japanese 
emperor to retain his throne. As a result, he could not be tried, even 
though he was the one person who had formal—and probably 
personal—responsibility for all aspects of Japan’s aggression.187 
Trying to tie together disparate defendants in a conspiracy when the 
one person they had in common was absent was a nearly impossible 
task.188 The U.S. had its reasons for immunizing the emperor: 
American officials believed that a cooperative emperor was their best 
hope for governing Japan. In Tokyo, as at Nuremberg, the need to 
cooperate with defeated officials and leaders warred with the desire 
to do justice, and the result was a message with little educational 
value, at least little that would directly serve the interests of the U.S. 
The trial was widely regarded as a political failure.189 Many Japanese 
citizens did not see the trial as a vindication of the rule of law but as 
victor’s justice. The trial contributed to a resurgence of nationalism 
during the postwar years.190 
 
 185. MEIRION HARRIES & SUSIE HARRIES, SHEATHING THE SWORD: THE 
DEMILITARIZATION OF JAPAN 163 (1987). 
 186. Id. at 175; see also DOWER, supra  note 145, at 471. 
 187. See HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 581–612 
(2000) (describing Emperor Hirohito’s role and the efforts to conceal it during the trial). 
 188. DOWER, supra note 145, at 459–60. 
 189. HARRIES & HARRIES, supra note 185, at 175–76; see also OSIEL, supra  note 37, at 181 
n.43 (citing sources recognizing the trial’s failure to “take[] root among the Japanese people”). 
 190. DOWER, supra note 145, at 444. 
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However, nationalism did not reassert itself in all quarters, and 
one historian argues that the trial—because it was a caricature of 
justice—contributed to postwar Japanese pacifism. “[T]he crimes 
revealed by the trial, compounded by the perception that this was a 
world gone mad with violence and that such crimes against peace and 
humanity were not unique to Japan, reinforced the deep aversion to 
militarization and war that had come with defeat.”191 If this was the 
lesson that the Japanese drew from the trial, it certainly was not the 
lesson intended by the Americans, who sought to remilitarize Japan 
as an ally against the Soviet Union and who not only abandoned 
further war crimes prosecutions after the Tokyo trial was over, but (as 
in Germany) cooperated with and supported war criminals, including 
a future prime minister who the U.S. thought could be useful in the 
Cold War.192 Political trials may have an educational function, but this 
function is often out of the hands of those who conduct them. 
The educational performance of political trials thus has a sorry 
history. Whether or not they result in convictions, they never teach 
exactly the kind of lesson that the government has in mind. The 
question, then, is why a government might be willing to undergo the 
risk of a trial to educate the public: why not send educative messages 
through propaganda, official statements, and other routine channels? 
Or, if the government does want to discover and publicize the truth 
about historical events, why not use truth commissions?193 
One answer is that the government believes that it can win a 
public political contest with its enemies. In such cases, the trial 
becomes a forum, like a legislative house, in which a policy debate is 
engaged. The value of the message is heightened if the defendant has 
a fair chance to refute it but fails to win over the public—especially 
when life or freedom are at stake, making the defendant a natural 
object of sympathy. To be sure, the government cannot present its 
message in as unadulterated a form as a propaganda message, but the 
message of the trial, because of the presence of the defendant, is more 
credible. 
 
 191. Id. at 474; see also BIX, supra note 187, at 612–18 (describing the complex reactions of 
the Japanese public). For a general discussion of Japanese attitudes about the Tokyo trial, along 
with a comparison to German attitudes about the Nuremberg trial, see IAN BURUMA, THE 
WAGES OF GUILT 159–68 (1994). 
 192. DOWER, supra note 145, at 525–26. 
 193. For a survey of truth commissions, see generally TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT (Harvard Law School Human Rights Program ed., 1997). 
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This argument is similar to the instrumental theory that political 
trials occur because governments need to maintain their credibility—
they serve the public interest and do not merely eliminate partisan 
opponents—when attempting to counter public threats. In the current 
argument, the defendant is not necessarily a real threat, but the 
defendant’s message is. The government gives the defendant the 
chance to publicize political views because the government believes 
that the public will reject them. 
The latter argument helps to explain why international political 
trials are almost always promoted and conducted by liberal 
democracies—which might seem paradoxical, given the rarity of 
domestic political trials in liberal democracies and their frequency in 
authoritarian states. The explanation is that the liberal democratic 
system has greater international appeal than any particular 
authoritarian system, because authoritarian systems always elevate 
the interests of some national or religious or ideological group; 
democratic systems are, in principle, universalistic. Every 
international political trial has been intended as a story about how an 
authoritarian government led its people astray, and, by implication, 
about how liberal democracies are superior. The creators and 
managers of trials are not always correct; sometimes, a trial does not 
convince anyone of anything. But the greater appeal of trials to 
democratic governments is easily understood.194 
D. International Criminal Trials 
1. General Considerations.  The international criminal trial195 is 
a special type of political trial. The “defendant” is now a soldier or 
former leader of a (usually) defeated state; the prosecuting 
“government” is now a foreign power, or a coalition of foreign 
powers, which vanquished the other state. The victor’s main goal is to 
 
 194. Professor Gary Bass, by contrast, argues that international trials occur because of the 
power of the legalist ideal. Leaders of liberal democracies seek to impose liberal values on 
defeated countries; the trial suggests itself as one way to advance this goal. See BASS, supra note 
13, at 8. There are two problems with Bass’s argument. First, the story breaks down at the 
domestic level: both ordinary authoritarian governments and democratic governments rely on 
courts. Second, international criminal trials from Nuremberg on do not reflect the legalist idea 
because they do not conform to the rule of law. They are attempts to impose liberalism, not 
legalism, on other countries. 
 195. I use this term to refer to trials of leaders and other major actors; for trials of ordinary 
soldiers and civilians, see supra Part IV.A. 
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eliminate the hostile government of the defeated state—its leaders 
and its supporters. The purpose of the trial is to define the category of 
individual, government, or state behavior that will not be tolerated by 
the victors, so that the rest of the world will understand what kind of 
behavior will provoke an international military response and what 
kind of behavior will not. 
The Nuremberg trial, for example, was an ambitious effort to 
define new rules of international conduct that would make a 
repetition of the two world wars impossible. The world wars were 
blamed in part on great power rivalries and the understanding that 
states were permitted to go to war for political objectives. Thus, one 
of the Nuremberg charges was the crime of aggressive war.196 And the 
conduct of World War II, with the German government’s mass 
slaughter of its own citizens as well as foreign citizens, led to the 
invention of “crimes against humanity.”197 These two crimes, and the 
notion that individuals (as opposed to states) could be charged for 
violating them, were all innovations.198 Ideally, if individuals in the 
future knew that they could be punished for the crimes of aggressive 
war, crimes against humanity, and also ordinary war crimes (also a 
subject of the Nuremberg trial, but not an innovation), they would be 
deterred from starting wars or conducting them too brutally. 
The Nuremberg trial had many of the elements of domestic 
political trial. The victorious governments, led by the United States, 
sought to accomplish two things. First, they wanted to eliminate the 
major Nazi figures. This could have been accomplished with summary 
execution—an option that was widely discussed and seriously 
considered. But there was a second goal as well. This was to show the 
world—including the citizens of Germany, the citizens of the 
victorious nations, and the governments of other countries—that 
there would be a new international order, one in which governments 
would not be permitted to engage in aggressive war (that is, use 
 
 196. POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 328. 
 197. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 162–63. 
 198. Prosecutors claimed that the Kellogg-Briand Pact could provide the  basis for the crime 
of aggressive war, but that agreement was not understood to create legal obligations, and 
certainly not criminal law applying to individuals. In any event, the Kellogg-Briand pact was a 
dead letter. The effort to create a crime of aggressive war continues today. The Rome Statute 
creating the International Criminal Court provides for further negotiation over the definition of 
such a crime, because states parties could not reach agreement. See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 5(2), July 1, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/ 
statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf. 
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military force to disturb the status quo), commit war crimes, and 
commit atrocities against their own citizens (such as genocide). The 
penalty for violation would be criminal prosecution. The flip side of 
this aggressive stance was that nations that did not do any of these 
things had nothing to fear from the United States and the Soviet 
Union, or from any other major power. Or, to shoehorn this analysis 
into the earlier categories, legitimate international political 
competition could no longer involve aggressive war or crimes against 
humanity. 
The advantages of holding international criminal trials following 
the conclusion of World War II can now be seen. The trials would 
show that the victorious powers were not interested in eliminating 
any person who happened to be a threat to their international 
ambitions, nor even in exercising the traditional victor’s prerogative 
of taking revenge. The victorious powers sought to punish only those 
who had, through their actions, endorsed the view that aggressive 
war, genocide, and similar actions were legitimate forms of 
international action. To persuade the world of their good faith, the 
victorious powers had to give the defendants an opportunity to be 
heard, to show that they had not engaged in the actions that, under 
the new order, would be considered crimes. Otherwise, the world 
would have no reason to believe that the victors sought to create a 
new international order that involved some self-restraint on their own 
ambitions. 
This was the ideal, but the managers of the trial ran into trouble 
from the beginning. None of the victors had acted consistently with 
the new rules that they were now pressing on the Germans, so the 
world might understandably react with skepticism to the victors’ 
claims that the rules were sustainable. Russia had engaged in 
aggressive war against Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states; the 
United States had dealt with its own internal racial problems with 
highly oppressive laws that could be likened to crimes against 
humanity; and all sides had committed atrocities in their conduct of 
the war. Within limits, the charges could be qualified; the Americans, 
for example, insisted that an element of the crime against humanity 
was that the atrocities occurred in a wartime setting, so as to avoid the 
charge that America’s racial laws were crimes against humanity. The 
defendants could, and did, try to make an issue of these 
inconsistencies; they could, and were, shushed by the courts (the 
London charter banned the “tu quoque” defense); but the fact 
remains that the rest of the world knew about the inconsistencies. The 
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problem was not so much one of victor’s justice, but a more basic 
problem about world order. If the states that were pressing for new 
norms of international conduct had never complied with them, what 
reason was there to think that they could be sustainable? 
At roughly the same time, the managers of the Tokyo trial were 
running into similar problems. The goals of this trial were the same as 
the goals of the Nuremberg trial: to eliminate powerful and influential 
people in the Japanese government, and to show that their 
elimination was tied to their violation to new norms of international 
legality, which would provide the basis for a peaceful world order. 
The problem was, again, that the United States as well as Japan had 
committed war crimes, and although Japan had clearly brought war to 
the United States, the roots of this war could be traced to a 
competition between two great powers for colonial influence in the 
west Pacific. No clear norms differentiated the conduct of the United 
States and Japan—Japan had Nanking, the United States had 
Hiroshima. These points were made by one of the dissenters, Justice 
Pal.199 For Pal and other critics such as Professor Shklar, the 
difference between Nuremberg and Tokyo was that the Germans 
engaged in mass extermination of their own citizens; the Japanese did 
not (though they did kill thousands of foreign citizens).200 
The literature considers Nuremberg a success and Tokyo a 
failure. One might doubt this judgment and conclude that both were 
failures. As noted in Section C, neither trial had clear, beneficial 
effects on public opinion; neither trial established much of a 
precedent. International criminal trials would not be used again for 
almost fifty years. In contrast to domestic political trials, we might 
infer that international political trials are unlikely to succeed because 
there is no international consensus on the line between legitimate 
(international) political competition and illegitimate international 
political competition. A consensus of states was not willing to accept 
the premise, for example, that a great power should not start a war to 
protect access to resources, as Japan did. 
If Nuremberg and Tokyo were failures, or if Nuremberg alone 
was a success because of the uniquely evil behavior of the Nazis, it 
can be readily understood why subsequent international criminal 
trials have been rare and not particularly successful. The problem has 
 
 199. See DOWER, supra note 145, at 471–72. 
 200. Id.; see SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 188–90. 
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always been that the U.S. and other states have been complicit in the 
reign of the defeated leader or that they have been unable to obtain a 
complete surrender. Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan 
Milosevic—these are people whom the U.S. at one time or another 
dealt with as legitimate leaders.201 Thus, the claim that they should be 
prosecuted for engaging in illegitimate behavior rings hollow. The 
judges have tried to deflect charges of bias by granting defendants an 
extremely high level of process, with the result that the trials drag on 
for years while the defendants use their trials as platforms for stirring 
up resentment and xenophobia at home.202 But no amount of process 
can overcome the fundamental problem of bias, which has nothing to 
do with the procedures, but rather with the bare fact that the trials are 
used by strong nations to assert their international ambitions at the 
expense of weak nations. 
2. The International Criminal Court.  If only the strongest states 
have the power to establish international tribunals, determine their 
memberships, set their agendas, and thus influence the development 
of international criminal law, predictably the resulting norms of 
international criminal law will reflect the interests of the strong states, 
not the weak ones. Thus, at Nuremberg, crimes against humanity 
were tied to war to immunize the United States from claims that its 
racial policies violated international criminal law. But weaker states 
could hardly be expected to submit to such an international order, 
and their efforts to gain influence have resulted in the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The ICC has an independent prosecutor and tribunal, and 
jurisdiction over international crimes committed by nationals of states 
parties and over international crimes committed on the territory of 
states parties.203 In theory, the ICC prosecutor decides on 
prosecutions in the same impartial way that ordinary prosecutors are 
 
 201. See, e.g., The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice 
or Show of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Rel. , 107th Cong. 107–71 (2002) 
(statement of Larry A. Hammond, Attorney at Law, Osborn Maledon, P.A.) (indicating that 
the U.S. provided assistance to the Croatian offensive against Serbia and may have been 
complicit in Croatian war crimes). 
 202. These problems were discussed by witnesses before a House hearing on U.N. criminal 
tribunals. See id. See generally Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: 
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111 (2002); Meernik, supra  note 10. 
 203. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, 13(b), July 1, 2002, available 
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf. 
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supposed to: on the basis of the seriousness of the crimes and the 
amount of resources available. What would this mean? Prosecutors 
would need to make the case that the crimes that they investigate are 
more serious than the crimes that they do not investigate; judges 
would need to persuade the world that convictions and sentences flow 
impartially from the extremely vague rules of law. 
This structure avoids the obvious forms of victor’s justice, but it 
introduces its own set of problems. On the one hand, because the 
U.N. Security Council no longer chooses which crises will be subject 
to investigation and prosecution,204 and because ICC members can no 
longer immunize themselves from prosecution, defendants cannot 
argue that the ICC is a tool of the great powers to suppress weak 
states they do not like. On the other hand, the ICC prosecutor and 
judges are human beings with their own national origins and biases, 
eager to satisfy whichever governments determine whether they 
retain their positions or obtain new ones. International politics still 
determines who is prosecuted and tried, which means that defendants 
can argue that their trials are politically motivated. 
One might argue that the new politics of international criminal 
adjudication under the ICC will reflect something like a global 
consensus on international crime, rather than the views of the United 
States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and a few other members of 
the Security Council. Defendants before the ICC will thus be arguing 
against the world, not a few great powers, and the claim of political 
motivation will be weaker. However, this benefit is purchased at a 
high price. Because the great powers no longer see themselves as 
having dominant influence over the development of international 
criminal law under the ICC, they have no reason to support it.205 
Thus, the main military and economic powers—predominantly the 
U.S., but also Russia and China206—have made it clear that they will 
have nothing to do with the ICC, and the U.S. has gone to great 
lengths to undermine it.207 Deprived both of the political support of 
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http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf. 
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the most powerful countries and the military means that these 
countries supply, the ICC is a frail institution with a dim future. 
International criminal trials, then, are analogous to domestic 
trials in a divided state. When the public is sufficiently divided, all 
trials will look like efforts by the government to eliminate its political 
opponents rather than like vindications of community norms 
incorporated in the law. In the international setting, international 
criminal tribunals will similarly look like efforts by the governments 
that influence the prosecutor and judges—whether the Security 
Council (in ad hoc cases) or the members of the ICC—to harass or 
embarrass states with contrary foreign policy objectives. The states 
whose nationals are being tried will always make this charge, however 
faithfully the prosecutor and judges try to carry out their duties. 
This charge will be hard to deflect, not only because it is difficult 
to prove to the world that it is hard to convict a criminal who has not 
been tried, but also because one’s judgment of the seriousness of a 
crime is unavoidably political. Suppose, for example, that leaders in a 
war of national liberation are responsible for the deaths of thousands 
of civilians who have been inadequately separated from the 
battlefield, whereas the authoritarian government on the other side 
has killed only a few hundred. Are the revolutionaries’ crimes more 
serious because more extensive or less serious because in the pursuit 
of a good cause? Would it matter if the rest of the world sided with 
the authoritarian government, or with the rebels; or what if the rest of 
the world is split between them? 
The American experience with domestic political trials is 
instructive. Domestic political trials can be politically successful only 
when they target extremists who can plausibly be considered 
threats—in the long or short term—to American political institutions 
and mainstream values. When domestic political trials are used 
against mainstream political opponents, as during the Federalist 
period, they contribute to political division rather than overcome it. 
The Nazis committed extraordinary atrocities, threatened all of the 
world’s major powers, and were thoroughly defeated; in these unique 
circumstances, there was enough international political consensus 
about the undesirability of the Nazi system to make an international 
trial possible—albeit one that was heavily controlled and quite 
controversial. Every other international trial has been a political 
failure—or, at least, cannot claim visible evidence of political 
success—either because it has introduced further divisiveness into an 
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arena in which consensus was absent, or because such divisions 
prevented it from accomplishing its goal. 
CONCLUSION 
Political trials owe their uneasy status in liberal democracies to 
their paradoxical role, which is to eliminate enemies of a system 
devoted to political tolerance. In a political trial, the normal 
constraints of liberal legalism yield, with judicial and public 
acquiescence, to the political imperative of self-preservation; this 
relaxation also creates an opportunity for the government to stifle 
legitimate political competition. Why do governments, then, not 
conduct political trials more often? The reason is that people 
understand that political trials can be used for partisan purposes, and 
a government that conducts political trials takes the risk that the 
public, or a large portion of it, will withdraw its support. For this 
reason, governments in liberal democracies conduct political trials 
only when they can plausibly claim a national emergency, and the 
public tolerates and approves of such trials only when it believes that 
the national emergency justifies giving the government powers that it 
can that it can potentially misuse for partisan gain. Governments can 
further enhance their political support, however, by granting what 
one might call “political process” to the defendants in political 
trials—the power to make a political defense of their activities. 
Whether the trial is conducted for partisan gain or public safety itself 
becomes an issue in the trial, and by allowing this issue to be 
addressed, the government shows that it believes that its policies 
enjoy the support of the public and that the defendant’s views do not. 
The political trial is a high-stakes exercise. If the government 
persuades the public that the defendant or the defendant’s views pose 
a threat to the nation, then its legitimacy will be enhanced, and the 
threat will be removed. If it does not, then it may lose public support 
and provoke a constitutional crisis. 
If this view is correct, it is too simple to criticize a political trial 
on the grounds that the defendant is being punished for particular 
political beliefs, or that the judge has unfairly relaxed normal process 
protections. The problem with this criticism is that sometimes 
departure from ordinary due process is justified. Due process 
standards have evolved to address normal criminal activity and do not 
reflect the special circumstances of an emergency or other crisis. 
Consider the contemporary example of the Guantánamo Bay military 
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commissions. It is not appropriate to critic ize them on the ground that 
they do not provide detainees with the process enjoyed by ordinary 
criminal defendants under domestic law or even with the level of 
process enjoyed by enemy soldiers who are tried for committing war 
crimes. The special circumstances created by the threat of further 
terrorism by al Qaeda call for special procedures that are tailored to 
that threat. 
I cannot provide a complete analysis of the problem here, but a 
few observations may be useful. Relaxed procedures are justified by 
the magnitude of the threat and the importance of secrecy. At what 
point should process be set, then? It seems to me that the answer is 
mainly one of international politics: to the extent that foreign states 
object that their citizens are being convicted for crimes without 
adequate process, the U.S. will need to take these objections seriously 
(which it has). There are also moral limits on what a government can 
properly do to an alien (or its own citizens) in the course of protecting 
itself, but if international law reflects the standard, these limits are 
minimal.208 Judicial involvement should be limited because there is no 
reason to think that the executive will not make the proper trade-offs; 
at least, there is no more reason to think so than in any other life-and-
death foreign policy decision that judges refrain from reviewing. So 
far, it is clear that the Bush administration is not using military 
commissions to target legitimate political opponents. 
In the case of domestic (including transitional) political trials, the 
real issue is whether the government makes a plausible case that the 
defendant—alone, as part of a group, or as a symbol for a certain 
message—poses a genuine threat to public safety or the constitutional 
system. If not, it is reasonable to object to the trial on the ground that 
the government is using the judicial process to eliminate legitimate, 
even if extreme, political opponents. But what makes the question 
difficult in any case is that the government will have legitimate 
reasons not to disclose all its evidence and can point to heightened 
security risks that justify public and judicial deference to its claims. In 
the case of international political trials, the real issue is whether the 
 
 208. The laws of war prohibit states from targeting enemy civilians, but states may kill them 
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Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) pt. IV, art. 51, §§ 1, 5(b), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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defendants or their worldview pose a threat to the international 
order, or at least are likely to make it worse rather than better. On 
this view, the conventional wisdom about Nuremberg is incorrect. It 
was not justified because it created new norms of international crime; 
those norms could have been created, without a trial, via treaty. 
Indeed, they were, in part. It was justified because, or to the extent 
that, it persuaded people around the world to abandon fascism and 
embrace liberal democracy (if in fact it did do this). 
The role of judges in both the domestic and international cases is, 
to a large extent, political. In the domestic cases, judges will not 
always know whether a prosecution is a regular criminal action or a 
political action, but they will have their suspicions. When they believe 
that the prosecution is political but are unsure whether the defendant 
is a public threat or not, they often can—and perhaps ought to—relax 
legal process and demand political process. Relaxing legal process 
may include broadly interpreting statutes, permitting selective 
prosecution or retroactive lawmaking, limiting the choice of defense 
lawyer, preventing the defendant from seeing classified evidence, or 
acquiescing in military trials. Granting political process includes, 
chiefly, allowing the defendant to mount a political defense—
typically, that the government’s motives are partisan and the judicial 
system is corrupt. As the decorum of the judicial forum yields to the 
circuslike atmosphere of democratic politics, many people will 
condemn the trial as a farce. But allowing politics into the courtroom 
may be preferable to the stark alternatives: preventing the 
government from countering genuine public threats or allowing the 
government to eliminate its political opponents under cover of 
judicial process. 
